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TROGDON, E. WAYNE. The Civil Rights Law of 1871 and Its 
Effect on Teacher Dismissal. (1980). 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 111 
Administrators and school boards are charged with the 
responsibility of renewing or dismissing teachers. When the 
school board elects to dismiss a teacher, considerable care 
must be taken to insure that the constitutional rights of the 
teacher are not violated in the dismissal process. If an 
individual's protected rights are violated, school officials 
can be held liable for their actions under the Civil Rights 
Law of 1871 (42 U.S.C. Section 1983). Relief under this act 
may take the form of equity or damages. 
The Civil Rights Law of 1871 was an obscure, forgot-
ten piece of legislation that was originally passed by the 
Forty-second Congress in response to the illegal activities 
of the Ku Klux Klan in Southern states. In 1961 the Supreme 
Court rediscovered the law and opened the federal judiciary 
to suits against public officials. Board members, administra-
tors, and the like could be sued under Section 1983. During 
the late sixties and throughout the seventies teachers have 
extensively used Section 1983 as a tool for challenging alleg-
ed unconstitutional acts in their dismissals. This potential 
liability has forced school board members and administrators 
to stay abreast of the constitutional rights of teachers. 
This study: (1) reviews court decisions that provide 
an in-depth analysis of Section 1983 litigation and the impact 
this litigation has on teacher dismissal process; and (2) 
examines the use of Section 1983 by the federal courts 
specifically in the Fourth Circuit. 
Judicial review indicates that in regard to Section 
1983: (1) qualified immunity (acting without malice and 
without violating a constitutional right) provides a great 
deal of protection for school officials; (2) if a prima facie 
case is established, the defendant must prove his entitlement 
to the qualified immunity defense; (3) First Amendment Rights 
are closely guarded by courts and deserve special caution 
from school officials; (4) if just cause for dismissal 
exists, procedural difficulties that do not produce provable 
injury cannot result in back pay or damages other than nomi-
nal damages set at one dollar; (5) any constitutional viola-
tion will normally entitle a plaintiff to attorneys' fees; 
(6) initially, a lawsuit does not have to mention Section 
1983 specifically but must include the general allegation 
that a federally protected right was violated; (7) section 
1983 lawsuit may be instituted in federal or state court; 
(8) generally, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state 
judicial or administrative remedies before bringing suit for 
damages; (9) courts have recognized customs in the absence 
of written policies and procedures and have rejected 
respondeat superior; (10) statute of limitations is borrowed 
from state law, normally three years; (11) school boards are 
viewed as municipal corporations and, therefore, do not enjoy 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Judicial review indicates that board members and ad-
ministrators must continually examine the constitutional 
validity of board policies, rules, and customs. Legal 
counsel should be sought whenever litigation might develop. 
The study est~blishes the need for school boards to protect 
themselves with personal liability insurance and also insur-
ance that will pTotect the liability of the board as an 
entity. The study further establishes that board members 
who act in good faith and base teacher dismissals on just 
cause, should have little difficulty defending their official 
acts if challenged under Section 1983. 
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School board members and school administrators who 
take actions or enforce regulations that result in statutory 
or constitutional violations may be liable for monetary 
damages, primarily as the result of the rediscovery of the 
Civil Rights Law of 1871 under Section 1983. 
1 
This rediscovery has caused board members and admini-
strators to carefully examine their actions to insure that 
they do not violate an individual's constitutional rights. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 United States Code 
Section 1983, provides: 
Every person who, under color of a statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory, 
subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the constitution and laws 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suii in equity or other proper proceedings for 
redress. 
Personal awards of money damages against school board 
members and administrators are a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Traditionally, the courts have awarded only equitable relief 
as opposed to money damages. 
Teachers facing dismissal were often at the mercy of 
incompetent or irresponsible admtnistrators and board members 
1 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1871). 
who violated the constitutional rights of teachers without 
fear of personal monetary damages. Legal redress for viola-
tion of an individual's basic rights was limited. Recently 
through the use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, teachers have had 
a tool to protect their constitutional rights. Recent court 
rulings have defined and broadened the use of 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983. 
The overall purpose of this study is to provide 
teachers, school board members, and administrators with an 
appraisal of the use of the Civil Rights Law of 1871 regard-
ing teacher dismissal. This study could be used as a guide 
in determining the teacher's use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
in a suit in which the teacher believes that his civil 
rights have been violated. 
2 
Also, the study is designed to assist school admini-
strators and school board members in avoiding liability for 
violating teachers' constitutional rights. The immunity of 
administrators and school board members is examined to pro-
vide an understanding that will assist both parties in acting 
in a professionally competent manner in regard to teacher 
dismissal. 
Selected court cases are examined to provide national 
overview of the use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and also cases 
from the Fourth Circuit and specifically North Carolina will 
be examined as to the application of Section 1983. 
3 
Statement of the Problem 
Administrators and boards of education are charged 
with the responsibility of renewing or dismissing teachers. 
Along with this responsibility is the realization t!1at the 
general public has little faith in the school systems and 
exerts considerable pressure to dismiss ineffective teachers. 
While the need for effective teachers certainly exists, ad-
ministrators and school board members must be cognizant of 
the constitutional rights of teachers or face liability for 
their actions under Section 1983. 
Knowledge of constitutional law and proof that 
actions were taken without malice or ill will are essential 
ingredients needed to avoid liability suits. An active, on-
going effort is necessary to expose areas that might result 
in liability and equally important is the stance of good 
faith in all official acts. Teacher dismissal can only 
occur as a fair, unbiased act which does not violate the 
individual's constitutional rights. 
Questions to be Answered 
The measures that school board administrators and 
school board members should adopt in order to avoid money 
damages due to violation of tea~hers' civil rights under 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983 are an important area of this study. To 
inform teachers of the constitutional protection that 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983 offers is also an integral feature. 
Listed on the following page are several key questions 
4 
concerning the relationships of school administrators, school 
board members and teachers to the Civil Rights Law of 1871 
which are to be answered in this research. 
1. What is the historical significance of the Civil 
Rights Law of 1871? What was it originally intended 
to do? How did it develop? How and why did it re-
emerge? 
2. What is the present legal status of the Civil Rights 
Law of 1871? What trends have developed concerning 
its use? 
3. What are the implications of the evolution of consti-
tutional law which permits judgments against school 
districts as entities as opposed to the traditional 
interpretation of Section 1983 which forced plain-
tiffs to sue only the individuals involved? 
4. What is the nature of the defense that a school 
official must make in order to avoid liability under 
Section 1983? Must ciefendants in a Section 1983 
action prove their immunity? How is immunity affect-
ed by such terms as ... good faith, misfeasance, 
Eleventh Amendment? 
5. Are school board members and administrators liable 
for emerging or evolving constitutional rights? 
6. What is the statute of limitations for a 1983 lawsuit? 
7. Can a Section 1983 lawsuit be instituted in federal 
or state court, and does the initial complaint have 
to mention specifically Section 1983? 
5 
8. What are the status and effect of awarding attorneys' 
fees in Section 1983 actions? 
9. What has been the general interpretation of the 
Fourth District and more specifically North Carolina 
regarding teacher dismissal cases and Section 1983 of 
the Civil Rights Law of 1871? 
10. What measures should school boards consider to avoid 
monetary damages from actions instituted under 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983? 
Scope of Study 
This study examines the origin and development of 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983 and its significance in regard to teacher 
dismissal. National and local cases relating to Section 1983 
are examined concerning school teacher dismissals. Examina-
tion of higher education cases is limited. Some attention is 
devoted to student rights cases which influenced litigation 
under Section 1983. 
Considerable attention is given to emerging trends 
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wood v. 
Strickland. 2 The cases selected will be dissected to expose 
the complexities confronting lawyers, courts, professional 
personnel, and school board members in relation to Section 
1983 and its protection of constitutional rights. 
2
420 u.s. 308 (1975). 
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Methods, Procedures, and Sources of Information 
The basic research technique of this legal historical 
study is to examine and analyze the available references con-
cerning the Civil Rights Law of 1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
and teacher dismissal. 
The Civil Rights Law of 1871 became a forgotten law 
almost upon its passage. Analyses of various historical doc-
umentaries was made in order to determine the circumstances 
that precipitated the emergence and disappearance of the law. 
The writer (who is a white public school administrator) 
attempted to examine both traditional white and black histor-
ical documentaries
3 
in order to synthesize an objective 
determination of the factors that influenced the evolution of 
the Civil Rights Law of 1871. 
A search of Dissertation Abstracts for related topics 
was made. Journal articles related to the topic have been 
located through the use of such sources as Reader's Guide to 
Periodical Literature, Education Index and Index to Legal 
Periodicals. 
3Richard Bardolph, The Civil Rights Record (New York: 
Thomas U. Crowell Co., 1970~pp. 1-163; Laurent B. Frantz, 
"Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
Against Private Acts," in The Supreme Court and Constitu-
tional Acts. Edited by Mart1n M. Shap1ro (Atlanta: Scott 
Foresman and Co., 1967), pp. 142-160; Eugene Gressman, "Post-
war Revolution in Civil Rights--and Judicial Counter Revolu-
tion," in Black Americans and The Supreme Court Since 
Emancipation. Ed1ted by .A.rnolcrM. Paul (New York: Holt 
Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 1-9; Howard Meyer, The Amend-
ment That Refused to Die (Radnor, Penn.: The Chilton Book 
Co., 1973), pp. 1-89; Charles W. Quick and Donald B. King, 
"An Overall View" in Legal Aspects of the Civil Rights Move-
ment. Edited by Donald B. K1ng (Detro1t: Wayne State Un1-
versity Press, 1965), pp. 7-34. 
7 
A computer search from Educational Resources Informa-
tion Center (ERIC) was made in order to review related liter-
ature, General research summaries were examined in the 
Encyclopedia of Education Research and in various books on 
school law. 
Federal and state court cases related to 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 were located through the use of the Corpus 
Juris Secundum, American Jurisprudence, The National Reporter 
System, and the American Digest System. 
Significance of Study 
Traditionally, tort cases represented the majority of 
legal actions involving schools. These actions under the 
common law of torts for harm provided the school official 
with considerable immunity which freed him from liability for 
harm caused others through governmental acts. He needed to 
be free "to exercise his discretion and to perform his 
official duties without fear that his conduct will be called 
into question at an evidentiary hearing or subject him to 
personal liability." 4 As W. Prosser, a leading academic 
authority on tort law states: "A public officer cannot be 
held liable for doing in a proper manner an act which is com-
manded or authorized by a valid law." 5 Under this test an 
official is immune from suit if the act from which the harm 
resulted was within the scope of his duty and was undertaken 
4 
Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F. 2d 602, 607 (7th 
Cir. 1973). 
5 
Prosser, W., Law of Torts 127 (4th ed. 1971). 
8 
without malice, corruption, or ill will. The burden of proof 
is on the plaintiff to prove bad faith. 
More recently, actions against school administrators 
and school board members have become more common under Sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Law of 1871. The advantages 
of Section 1983 instead of tort action are obvious. The Wood 
v. Strickland decision clarified the immunity of school offi-
cials and school board members. It stated that in suits 
brought under civil rights statutes like Section 1983, a 
plaintiff need not allege malice. Once the plaintiff demon-
strates that his constitutional - ights have been violated and 
brings himself within the statute, the board member must 
prove at the trial that he acted in sincere belief in the 
correctness of his behavior and in compliance with the re-
quirements of the Constitution. Under tort law the board 
member could answer that his acts are those of a governmental 
officer, and the plaintiff's action will be defeated unless 
the plaintiff can prove malice or absence of good faith on 
the board member's part. Under the qualified immunity of 
the Wood decision, the defendant must raise and prove good 
faith as a defense or be subject to personal monetary 
damages. Recently, the courts have determined that school 
boards can be sued directly under Section 1983. This will-
ingness to allow school boards to be sued directly without 
necessarily demanding damages from an individual opens the 
door to suits against the financial resources of school 
boards. Also, judges and juries may take a different view 
of the amount of damages that may be awarded in a Section 
1983 suit, if the financial resources of a school district 
are at stake rather than the personal resources of a school 
board member or school administrator. 
9 
All of these considerations point toward a continued 
resurgence of the use of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Law 
of 1871. Today constitutional protections exist at a time 
when school administrators and school board members are under 
tremendous public pressure to improve our nation's schools. 
One method that school officials have to upgrade schools is 
to dismiss teachers whose employment is detrimental to the 
profession. A clear understanding of teacher dismissal and 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 will enable school 0dministrators and 
school board members to fulfill their charged responsibility 
of teacher dismissal without violating constitutional rights. 
This understanding will also help to avoid liability suits 
against individual board members as persons and against 
school boards as entities. 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of the study is divided into three 
major parts. Chapter two discusses the initial reason for 
the adoption of the Civil Rights Law of 1871. Consideration 
is given to the use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 from 1871 until 
the advent of the United States Supreme Court case Monroe v. 
Pape in 1961. 
Chapter three is a legal analysis of national cases 
that help to clarify 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and teacher 
dismissal. The cases pertain to the following areas: (1) 
civil rights, (2) liability under Section 1983, (3) First 
Amendment Rights, (4) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due 
process, (5) Eleventh Amendment immunity, (6) statute of 
limitations, (7) exhaustion of remedies, (8) when to file, 
(9) attorneys' fees, (10) liability of school officials in 
their official r-apacities or as entities. 
10 
The fourth chapter examines the United States Fourth 
Circuit decisions concerning Section 1983 and teacher dis-
missal. The Fourth Circuit interp~etation of Section 1983 
will also be analyzed. 
Chapter five, the concluding chapter of the study, 
contains a review and summary of the information obtained 
from the historical analysis and an examination of related 
cases. 
Conclusions concerning the status of Section 1983 
and teacher dismissal and related areas are drawn in a form 
that will, it is hoped, enlighten educators. Finally, sug-
gestions are made to school administrators and school board 




HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAW OF 1871 
On January 1, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued 
the Emancipation Proclamation. This document declared that 
the slaves in states which were still in arms against the 
1 federal government were "forever free." In December, 1863, 
the House of Representatives received a resolution for a 
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery 
within the United States or any place subject to its juris-
diction. By January, 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment had been 
ratified and the abolition of slavery became lega1. 2 The 
Thirteenth Amendment also empowered Congress to maintain this 
freedom by "appropriate legislation."3 
Slavery in the Southern states may have ended legally 
with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, but 
slavery did not cease in reality for Negroes. President 
Andrew Johnson's reconstruction plan enabled Southern states 
to re-enter the federal government with little difficulty. 
Johnson pardoned all Southerners who took an oath of allegi-
ance (except for a few important ex-Confederates who had to 
request special pardons), recognized the loyal governments 
1Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). 
2 U. S. Const. amendment XIII, sec. 1. 
3Ibid., sec. 2. 
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already established by Lincoln in four of the states, and 
appointed temporary governors in the other seven states, em-
powering them to hold elections and form state governments. 
By the end of 1865 all of these states had set up state 
governments, ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, and according 
to President Johnson were restored to the Union. In 1865 and 
1866 these newly "reconstructed states" enacted laws referred 
to as the 11 Black Codes." These laws prohibited Negroes from 
moving from one place to another and bound them to their 
former masters as "apprentices." Negroes remained slaves in 
all but a constitutional sense. By virtue of these codes, 
Negroes were an oppressed people bound to the land. 
When the Thirty-ninth Congress convened in December, 
1865, the reconstruction politicians rejected President 
Johnson's reconstruction plan. Congress refused to seat the 
newly elected Southern congressmen and declared invalid the 
recently formed state governments in the South. (Under 
Article I of the United States Constitution, each house of 
Congress was empowered to judge the election and qualifica-
tions of its members.) 
From this Congress, the first civil rights act in 
our history was drawn up by Senator Lyman Trumbull of 
Illinois. The senator proposed that equality and freedom 
could not be thought of separately and that unequal treat-
ment was a kind of slavery which Congress had a right to 
stop. Trumbull also believed that Congress had the obliga-
tion and power to protect the civil rights of individuals 
13 
whose respective states allowed mob violence and local law-
lessness to exist. 
Very basic rights were covered in this initial civil 
rights legislation: federal citizenship for Negroes; the 
right to enter into contracts; the right to sue; the right to 
give evidence; the right to acquire, hold, and convey real 
4 property. In addition the act provided that Negroes and 
whites were to be given equal benefit of all laws covering 
the security of a person and property, and that deprivation 
of civil rights would be a federal offense. 5 
The civil rights bill became the Act of April 9, 
1866, being enacted over the veto of President Johnson. Many 
proponents of the act concluded that the civil rights secured 
by this act should be placed beyond the possibility of repeal 
by any later Congress. Among those who believed in the need 
for the constitutional guarantee of these rights was Repre-
sentative John Bingham of Ohio who at the onset of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress proposed a constitutional amendment on 
the subject. 
Bingham became a member of the newly created Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction which was authorized to examine 
the whole question of political reconstruction and to make 
new proposals for congressional action. The Joint Committee 
conducted hearings about the conditions th~t freed men faced 
in the South. Evidence was presented that demonstrated how 
4 
14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
5Ibid. 
the "Black Codes" kept former slaves "in their place" and 
forced them to work on terms and in conditions similar to 
slavery. Evidence was also given depicting the individual 
and group abuse of blacks and whites who were loyal to the 
Union. 
14 
Following the investigation, the Joint Committee 
decided that an amendment was definitely needed to strengthen 
the permanency of the civil rights legislation of 1866 and to 
insure the permanency of such rights against any attempts to 
repeal by a later Congress. In April, 1866, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was proposed by the committee, and Congress immedi-
ately referred the amendment to the states for ratification. 
John Bingham was the author of Section 1 of the Amendment. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jarisdiction therof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges of immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person
6
within its jurisdiction, the equal protec-
tion of laws. 
With the eventual ratification of the amendment in 
1868, equal protection of the law became a constitutional 
mandate. This mandate would prove to be a prominent force in 
the future struggle for equality. 
Tennessee was the only Southern state to immediately 
ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and be readmitted to the 
Union. The other ten Confederate states rejected the amend-
ment. 
6 U. S. Const. amendment XIV, sec. 1. 
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To £orce the South to accept its terms, Congress in 
1867 passed a series of Reconstruction Acts over President 
Johnson's veto. The legislation provided that: (1) the ten 
states still unreconstructed were to be divided into five 
military districts with a major general in control of each; 
(2) constitutional conventions, elected by Negroes and loyal 
whites, were to frame constitutions providing for black 
suffrage; (3) these constitutions were to be acceptable to 
Congress; (4) qualified voters were to elect state legisla-
tures pledged to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) with 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states 
could apply for representation in Congress. 7 
The political power in Southern states now shifted 
from the upper classes, which had been dominant before the 
Civil War, to a completely new political force. After the 
registration of Southern voters under the terms of the Recon-
struction Acts of 1867, there were 703,000 Negroes registered 
and only 627,000 whites on the lists. The large Negro vote 
came under the centro~ of two unprincipled white elements. 
One element included the Northerners (carpetbaggers) who had 
moved South with the expectation of achieving power and for-
tune, and the other element consisted of a few Southern 
whites (scalawags) who sought political and financial gain 
by supporting the reconstru(.~lon policy of Congress. 
Controlled by these elements, seven Southern states 
met the requirements of the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and 
714 Stat. 428 (1867). 
16 
were readmitted to the Union in 1868. The Southern legisla-
tures (1868-1869) were often characterized by extravagance 
and corruption. Exorbitant public debts and excessively 
burdensome taxes became common in Southern states. In North 
Carolina the public debt more than doubled in two years. 
Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi and Texas were not 
readmitted into the Union until 1870 when their legislatures 
were required to satisfy the conditions of the Reconstruction 
Acts of 1867 and to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. This 
constitutional addition stated that "the right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any state on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude. " 8 
The reaction of Southern whites to the political con-
dition of the late 1860's became violent and was characterized 
by a policy of terrorism. Secret societies--the Ku Klux Klan, 
the Knights of the White Camellia, the Boys of '76--committed 
acts of terrorism in an effort to frighten the Negroes and 
compel them to stay away from the polls. 
Congress attempted to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with the passage of a new Civil Rights Act on May 31, 
1870. The law re-enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act in order 
to make it clear that the constitutionality of its provisions 
rested on federal power granted by the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The act also provided criminal penalties 
8 U. S. Const. amendment XV, sec. 1. 
for depriving anyone of the rights enumerated in the 1866 
Civil Rights Act.
9 
In an attempt to protect the suffrage rights of 
Negroes, Congress legislated that supervision of elections 
was to be undertaken by persons appointed by federal courts 
17 
and any interference with the work of an election supervisor 
was a federal offense. 10 
In spite of these measures, fear, intimidation, and 
physical violence increased in the Southern states. Grad-
ually, Southern whites began to regain control of their local 
and state governments. The recently gained constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of Negroes began to fade without the pro-
tection of local or state governments. 
It became increasingly obvious that the constitutional 
guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were not 
being enforced in the South. On March 23, 1871, President 
Ulysees Grant sent a message to Congress describing the 
situation: 
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the 
Union rendering life and property insecure and the carry-
ing of the mails and the collection of the revenue dang-
erous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists 
in some localities is now before the Senate. That the 
power to correct these evils is beyond the control of 
State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the 
Executive of the United States, acting within the limits 
of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies 
is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such leg-
islation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually 
916 Stat. 140 (1870). 
1016 Stat. 433 (1871). 
secure life, liberty, and property, and the ent~rcement 
of law in all parts of the United States •.. 
18 
The ensuing debate in Congress was filled with refe-
rences to the lawless conditions that existed in the South in 
1871. A 600-page report was presented to the Forty-second 
Congress describing the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and 
the inability of state governments to cope with the Klan. 
The extent of non-compliance by Southern states to enforce 
constitutional law was reflected in the speeches of Congress-
men. Congressman David P. Lowe of Kansas said: 
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whip-
pings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon 
unoffending American citizens, the local administrations 
have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the 
proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night 
and hides them conspiracies, wicked as the worse felons 
could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity 
is given to crime and the records of the public tribunals 
are searched in vain for any evidence of effective re-
dress.1Z 
Congressman John Beatty of Ohio summarized in the 
House of Representatives the unwillingness or inability of 
states to enforce state law when he said: 
... certain states have denied to persons within their 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The proof 
on this point is voluminous and unquestionable . . . 
[M]en were murdered, houses were burned, women were out-
raged, men were scourged, and officers of the law shot 
down; and the State made no successful effort to bring 
the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress 
to the outraged and innocent. The State, from lack of 
power or inclination, practically dey~ed the equal pro-
tection of the law to these persons. 
11cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 244. 
12 Ibid., p. 374. 
13Ibid., p. 428. 
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Senator Daniel D. Pratt of Indiana emphasized the 
discrimination against Union sympathizers and Negroes in the 
actual enforcement of the laws: 
Plausibly and sophistically it is said the laws of North 
Carolina do not discriminate against them; that the pro-
visions in favor of rights and liberties are general; 
that the courts are open to all; that juries, grand and 
petit, are commanded to hear and redress without distinc-
tion as to color, race, or political sentiment. 
But it is a fact, asserted in the report, that of the 
hundreds of outrages committed upon loyal people through 
the agency of this Ku Klux organization not one has been 
punished. This defect in the administration of the laws 
does not extend to other cases. Vigorously enough are 
the laws enforced against Union people. They only fail 
in efficiency when a man of known union sentiments, 
white or black, invokes £2eir aid. Then Justice closes 
the door of her temples. 
These statements indicated that the lawmakers be-
lieved that some Southern states were not enforcing the pro-
visions of the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment and 
consequently, the rights, privileges, and immunities of many 
citizens were being denied. 
Adoption of the Civil Rights Law of 1871 
On March 28, 1871, Representative Samuel Shellabarger 
of Ohio, acting for a House select committee, reported H. R. 
320, a bill "to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution and for other purposes."15 
Section 1, now codified as 42 U.S.C. Section 1893, 
spoke directly to these violations of constitutional rights, 
was subject tc limited debate, and passed without 
14 Ibid., p. 505. 
15 Ibid., p. 522. 
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amendment. 16 Representative Shellabarger explained the func-
tion of Section 1: 
[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons 
whose former conditions may have been that of slaves, but 
also to all people where, under color of state law, they 
or any of them may be deprived of rights to which they 
are entitled under the Constit~;ion by reason and virtue 
of their national citizenship. 
Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont, the manager of 
H. R. 320 in the Senate, reiterated the sentiments of Repre-
sentative Shellabarger: 
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects 
to, as defining the rights secured by the Constitution 
of the United States when they are assailed by any State 
law or under color of any State law, and it is merely 
carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 
1866], which have since become a part of the Constitu-
tion. 
[Sect~on ~ isl 8so very simple and really re-enacting the Const1tut1on. 
These statements corroborated Congress' intention that 
the enactment of Section 1 would provide a broad remedy for 
violations of federally protected civil rights. Sections 2 
through 4 dealt primarily with the suppression of Ku Klux 
Klan violence in Southern states. Section 2 described cer-
tain federal crimes in addition to those defined in Section 2 
of the 1866 Civil Rights Acts, 14 Statute 27, each aimed pri-
marily at the Ku Klux Klan. Section 3 empowered the Presi-
dent to send the militia into any state wreaked with Klan 
violence. Section. 4 provided for suspension of the writ of 
16 Ibid. 
17Ibid., App. p. 68. 
18 Ibid., p. 568. 
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habeas corpus in enumerated circumstances, again primarily 
concerning Klan violence. Sections 2 through 4 invoked con-
siderable debate and each section was amended. Debate on 
Section 1 was limited in both Houses and passed as introduced. 
The House finished the initial debate on H. R. 320 on 
April 7, 1871, and one week later the Senate voted out a bill. 
Prior to the vote taken in the Senate, Senator John Sherman of 
Ohio introduced an amendment that could not be debated at that 
time according to Senate rules. The amendment was added as 
Section 7 at the end of the bill. The amendment placed lia-
bility not on municipal corporations but made any inhabitant 
of a municipality liable for damages inflicted by persons 
"riotously or tumultously assembled." 
19 
The House did not accept the Sherman Amendment and 
other amendments made by the Senate; therefore, H. R. 320 
went to a conference committee. On April 18, 1871, the con-
ference committee draft was completed. The committee's draft 
of the Sherman Amendment gave a cause of action to persons 
injured by: 
Any persons riotously and tumultously assembled together; 
. with intent to deprive any person of any right con-
ferred upon him by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercis-
ing such right, or by reason of hi2 0race, color, or pre-vious condition of servitude ... 
This action would be against the county, city, or 
parish in which the riot had occurred and it could be 
19 rbid., App. pp. 41-42. 
20 rbid., App. pp. 42-43. 
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maintained by either the person injured or his legal represen-
tative. Liability for damages was changed from the property 
of the well-to-do, as in the original Sherman Amendment, and 
was placed on the local government. 
Senator Sherman presumably assumed that taxes would 
be levied against the property of inhabitants to pay for the 
liability of local governments. Sherman stated: 
Let the people of property in the Southern States under-
stand that if they will not make hue and cry and take 
the necessary steps to put down lawless violence in those 
states their property will be ~~lden responsible, and the 
effect will be most wholesome. 
The first conference substitute passed the Senate but 
was rejected by the House. The House opposition rejected the 
obligation of municipal corporations to keep the peace if 
those corporations were not obligated or authorized by their 
state charters. Congress was seen as not having the consti-
tutional right to impose liability damage for nonperformance 
of a duty for obligations that Congress had no right to re-
quire municipalities to perform. The Sherman Amendment would 
have made a municipality liable for damages that may be in-
curred in a riot even if the municipality knew nothing of the 
impending or ensuing riot, or did not have the organization 
to do anything about it. The statute even held the munici-
pality liable if it had done everything possible in its power 
to curb the riot. 
The second conference co1mnittee abandoned the munici-
pal liability and, instead, made "any person or persons 
21 Ibid., p. 761. 
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having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate civil rights 
was afoot], and having power to prevent or aid in preventing 
the same," who did not attempt to stop the same, liable to 
any person injured by the conspiracy. 22 Both Houses of Con-
gresses adopted the amendment in this form and coded it 42 
U.S.C. Section 1986. 
During all of the congressional debate surrounding 
the Sherman Amendment, very little controversy centered upon 
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act. A clear distinction 
existed between a municipality's liability for failing to 
keep the peace and a municipality's liability for failing to 
uphold the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Luke P. 
Poland of Vermont, drawing from Contract Clause precedents, 
indicated that Congress could constitutionally confer juris-
diction on federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold 
municipalities liable for using their authorized powers in 
violation of the Constitution. 23 
The Contract Clause precedents included enforcement 
efforts that took various forms of "positive" relief, such 
as ordering taxes to be levied and collected, for the purpose 
of discharging federal court judgments, once a constitutional 
infraction was found. 24 Following the court's action in the 
vices, 
22rbid., p. 804. 
23 rbid., p. 794. 
24Monell v. New York City Department of Social Ser-
98 S. Ct. 20lS (1978). 
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Contracts Clause, Justice William Brennan reasoned in the 
landmark Monell case: 
Since Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act simply conferred 
jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment - a situation precisely 
analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under 
which the Contract Clause was enforced against munici-
palities - there is no reason to suppose that opponents 
of the Sherman Amendment would have found any constitu-
tional barrier to Section 1 suits against municipali-
ties.25 
Also an important concept that was well understood in 
1871 was that corporations should be treated as a natural 
person for virtually all purposes of constitutional and 
statutory analysis. In 1844 this doctrine was succinctly 
stated: 
A corporation created by and doing business in a particu-
lar state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as 
a person, although an artificial person . . . capable of 
being trusted as a citizen of that state as much as a 
natural person.26 
The Letson principle was extended to municipal corpo-
rations only two years before the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 
Following the Cowles v. Mercer County decision of 
1869, municipal corporations were routinely sued in federal 
courts, 27 and just months before the Civil Rights of 1871, 
Congress passed the Dictionary Act that provided: 
in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may 
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate 
. . . unless the context show such words were intended 
to be used in a more limited sense [ ].z8 
25 Ibid., p. 4576. 
26Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 558 (1844). 
277 Wall. 118, 121 (1869). 
28Dictionary Act, sec. 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). 
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From 1871 to Monroe v. Pape 
The first reported case under Section 1983 was North-
western Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park29 in 1873. The Circuit 
Judge in a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a munici-
pal defendant interpreted Section 1 as including local govern-
ment bodies within the realm of "persons" who could be sued. 
Until 1961 this was the general interpretation of Section 1 
of the Civil Rights Law of 1871. The following are Section 
1983 cases involving a municipality as a defendant: City of 
M h L "b 30 H c· f H h"ll 31 D 1 anc ester v. e1 y, annan v. 1ty o aver 1 , oug as 
v. City of Jeannetta, 32 and Holmes v. City of Atlanta. 33 
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Law of 
1871, Congress added a piece of legislation which was regard-
ed as the capstone for the congressional civil rights program 
between the years 1866 and 1875. During these years Congress 
attempted to make secure the constitutional ideals of freedom 
and equality for all Americans. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 
prohibited racial discrimination in inns, public conveyances, 
and places of amusement. federal courts were given exclusive 
jurisdiction over cases arising under this statute. 34 This 
act was designed to completely erase the brand of slavery by 
2918 F. Cas. 393, 394 (1873). 
30117 F. 2d 661 (1941). 
31
120 F. 2d 87 (1941). 
32 319 u.s. 157 (1943). 
33350 u.s. 879 (1955). 
3418 Stat. 336 (1875). 
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giving Negroes freedom to exercise their civil rights without 
discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 granted all the 
fundamental rights which national citizenship was thought to 
include. 
The comprehensive civil rights program enacted from 
1866 to 1875 was not a solution for the black man, however. 
The loose, imprecise language of the constitutional amend-
ments, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, permitted the 
enemies of the civil rights movement to persuade the judici-
ary to follow a strict interpretation of the amendments. 
Fi~st evidence of this strict interpretation was given 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1873 in the Slaughter-
35 house Cases. The court stated that only national citizen-
ship received any protection from the privileges and 
immunities section of the Fourteenth Amendment and that such 
· national citizenship did not encompass any of the fundamental 
rights of the individual. Those rights were bound only to 
state citizenship. 
National citizenship was seen as including only cer-
tain rights that went beyond the reach of state citizenship. 
These included the right to travel to the national capitol, 
the right to free access to subtreasuries, the right to pro-
tection abroad and on high seas, and the right to sue in 
federal courts. 36 The restrictive interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment furnished a means to weaken the previous 
civil rights legislation. 
3583 u.s. 36 (1873), 
36 Ibid., p. 74. 
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In 1875 in United States v. Cruikshank,
37 
the United 
States Supreme Court again determined that the rights and 
privileges of the Fourteenth Amendment dealt only with those 
rights incidental to national citizenship. The case grew out 
of a bloody incident known as the "Colfax massacre." In 
Louisiana two groups, one Democrat and the other Republican, 
claimed to have won the 1872 election with the federal govern-
ment recognizing the Republican faction. In the small town of 
Colfax, the Republican sheriff summoned a Negro posse which 
occupied the building used as a courthouse. On April 13, 
1873, a white mob surrounded the courthouse, set it afire and 
shot the Negroes to death as they emerged from the burning 
building. 
The white men were acquitted of murder and conspiracy 
charges when the United States Supreme Court decided that in-
timidation of Negroes by private individuals to prevent them 
from peacefully assembling for lawful purposes was a local 
matter stemming from state citizenship and was not affected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 38 
Two 1883 cases illustrate the judicial negation of 
the civil rights legislation from 1866 to 1875. In the Civil 
Rights Cases, 39 the United States Supreme Court declared the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional on the ground that 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not prohibit 
acts of individual discrimination. 
37 92 u.s. 542 (1875). 
38 Ibid. , p. 551. 
39 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
28 
Also in 1883 in United States v. Harris,
40 
the United 
States Supreme Court declared void the criminal conspiracy 
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. This section made 
it an offense to conspire to deprive any person of the equal 
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws. The reasoning was that since the Fourteenth 
Amendment was construed to concern only state action, it 
could not be used to sustain an action of a private nature. 
The result of these decisions was the resumption of 
prime responsibility for the protection of basic civil rights 
by Southern states. Following the Reconstruction Period, 
most Southern Negroes were prevented from exercising their 
right to vote by such devices as poll taxes, literacy tests, 
and intimidation. Jim Crow laws were adopted by all Southern 
states and several Northern states. These laws provided for 
segregation in the facilities of railroads, in waiting rooms, 
inns, barber shops, places of amusement, libraries, parks and 
schools. Nearly a century would pass before the United 
States Supreme Court in 1954 would rule that segregation in 
the public schools was unconstitutional. 
Reemergence of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
The Civil Rights Law of 1871 would remain an all but 
forgotten piece of legislation. Not until the volatile 
1960's did civil rights become a major issue again. 
40106 u.s. 629 (1883). 
29 
41 "d d In 1961 a Chicago case, Monroe v. Pape, prov1 e 
the opportunity for the resurgence of the Civil Rights Law 
of 1871 which would be used as a major tool in seeking damages 
for violation of individual constitutional rights. The com-
plaint alleged that thirteen Chicago police officers broke 
into James Monroe's home in the early morning, routed him 
from bed, made him stand naked in the living room, and ran-
sacked every room. Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police 
station and detained on "open" charges for ten hours while he 
was interrogated about a murder committed two days previously. 
He was taken before a magistrate and not permitted to call his 
attorney or family before being released. The complaint al-
leged that Mr. Monroe's "rights, privileges, and immunities" 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution had been violated 
since the officers had no search or arrest warrant, and Mr. 
Monroe was detained without a warrant or an arraignment. 42 
The District Court dismissed the complaint as stating 
no cause for action under the statute. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment, insofar as it held that the complaint 
did not state a cause of action against the defendant police 
officers, but affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against 
th C. f Cl. 43 e 1ty o ·1cago. 
4l365 U.S: 169 (1961). 
42 Ibid., pp. 495-496. 
43 Ibid., p. 493. 
In making this decision, the Warren Court examined 
the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The 
Court's determination was that the Forty-second Congress 
doubted its constitutional authority to impose civil lia-
bility on municipalities. This Reconstruction Congress did 
not intend the word "person" to encompass municipalities or 
municipal agencies. The Court based this reasoning on the 




Monroe v. Pape placed an important limitation on whom 
suits could be imposed upon under Section 1983. In school 
cases, suits could not be filed directly against the school 
district itself, but against the school officers--school 
board members, administrators and the like. School districts 
could not be sued even though the school officials who were 
sued had been acting fully within the authority conferred 
upon them by the school district. 
One lasting effect of Monroe v. Pape was the resur-
rection of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 which proved to be legisla-
tion appropriate for the needs of a changing, modern society. 
The sixties and seventies witnessed a tremendous 
expansion in federal power to protect rights. These years 
saw increased federal protections involving public school 
students, freedom of speech, press and assembly, right to 
petition the government for redress of grievances, equal pro-
tection of the laws, procedural and substantial due process 
44Ibid., p. so7. 
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d . 1 . "1 d . . . 45 an ent1t ement to pr1v1 eges an 1mmun1t1es. 42 u.s.c. 
Section 1983 served as a convenient vehicle to enforce these 
expanding rights as reflected in the following statement by 
the California Supreme Court: 
Section 1983 was enacted over a century ago in a response 
to the patent inadequacy of state enforcement of consti-
tutional guarantees for the newly enfranchised black 
citizenry. While the civil disorders of the Ku Klux 
Klan in the 19th Century, which included passage of the 
Civil Rights Act, are no longer significant, society has 
not reached the idyllic state in which all vestiges of 
racism, oppression, and malicious deprivation of consti-
tutional rights have been eliminated. Accordingly, the 
purpose underlying Section 1983--i.e., to serve as an 
antidote to discriminatory state laws, to protect fede-
ral rights where state law is inadequate, and to protect 
federal rights where state processes are availabl~ 6 in theory but not in practice, must still be served. 
The following chapter will examine the evolution of 
Section 1983 in the sixties and seventies. Selected judicial 
decisions will be used to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in safeguarding the constitutional 
rights of citizens. 
45Thomas A. Shannon, "The U. S. Civil Rights Act: A 
New Dimension in the Liability of Public School People," 
Current Legal Issues in Education, 1 (1977): 105-106. 
46williams v. Horvath, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (1976). 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CASES CLARIFYING 42 U.S.C. 
SECTION 1983 AND TEACHER DISMISSAL 
Thomas Shannon, Executive Director of the National 
School Board Association, described Section 1983 as '' . . . 
an expanding funnel through which a whole variety of litiga-
1 
tion may be brought against school people."- Section 1983 
litigation has become increasingly heavy since Monroe v. Pape 
in 1961. American School Board Journal in 1976 reported more 
than 400 personal liability actions involving more than 1,500 
school officials in less than three years. 2 
Federal jurisdiction in civil rights actions brought 
under Section 1983 was granted by 28 U.S.C. Section 1343. 
However, in suits in which the damage claim exceeds $10,000, 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 has been invoked on direct 
challenges of constitutional violations by federal 
officials. 3 State jurisdiction is also available. 
1Thomas A. Shannon, "The U. S. Civil Rights Act: A 
New Dimension in the Liability of Public School People," 
Current Legal Issues in Education 1 (1977): 105. 
2wayne R. Fitter and Don C. Patton, "Liability Pro-
tection for Professional School Personnel," Phi Delta Kappan 
60 (March 1979): 525. 
3Floyd G. Delon, "Update on School Personnel and 
School District Immunity and Liability Under Section 1983, 
Civil Rights Act of 1871," Journal of Law and Education 8 
(April, 1979). - -- --
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Civil Rights Litigation 
The first educational litigation involving Section 
4 
1983 occurred in a North Carolina case in 1966. The Hender-
sonville Board of Education reemployed every white teacher 
who indicated a desire to be reemployed and also employed 
fourteen inexperienced white teachers. But sixteen out of 
twenty-four black teachers, who had been employed the previous 
year in an all-black school, were not offered reemployment. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the school 
board had to set up objective standards for the employment 
and retention of teachers - black and white to be treated in 
like manner. The Hendersonville Board of Education's efforts 
to desegregate in accordance to the 1954 United States Supreme 
Court's mandate was typical of civil rights violations that 
resulted in Section 1983 action. 
In another Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision 
it was held that black teachers, who were not needed in their 
former posts because of a reduction of black enrollment in 
their respective buildings, were entitled to preference for 
reemployment in the system over new candidates. The court 
mandated that black teachers and white teachers should be 
governed by the same policy concerning staff reduction. 5 
4 chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Education, 
364 F. 2d 189 (1966). 
5
North Carolina Teachers Association v. Asheboro City 
Board of Education, 393 F. 2d 736 (1968). 
Another North Carolina case 6 provided guidance for 
nonretention of individual black teachers. A black teacher 
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with thirteen years in the school system was not recommended 
for renewal by the school board. The teacher held a bache-
lor's and master's degree and had been recommended for re-
employment by her former black principal at an all-black 
school. Shortly after submitting the recommendation, the 
principal was notified by his superintendent that the allo-
cation of teachers for the school had been reduced for the 
following year because, under a newly instituted freedom-of-
choice plan, some black pupils had transferred to formerly 
all-white schools. The principal having received no instruc-
tions on how to reduce his staff notified the teacher of her 
nonrenewal. Acting on the advice of the superintendent, the 
teacher in question interviewed with all the principals in 
the school system, but was not hired. Her former principal 
would later remark that he considered her a "trouble maker" 
with whom he had had some difficulties. The superintendent 
made no independent evaluation of her fitness, nor did he or 
the board compare her qualifications, or the gravity of her 
alleged faults, with those of other teachers in the system. 
The district court upheld the board's decision not to 
have a hearing for nonrenewal of the teacher's contract. The 
court stated that because of the absence of a tenure law, the 
6 Wall v. Stanley County Board of Education, 259 F. 
Supp. 238 (1966). 
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lack of a hearing would not be a denial of due process. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court's 
decision and proclaimed the teacher was entitled to receive 
damages as well as to have the opportunity of being objec-
tively considered for reemployment, with the burden of justi-
fying a failure to rehire being placed on the school board. 
School boards became responsible for justifying 
teacher dismissals on the basis of clear and convincing evi-
dence when the plaintiffs established an initial case of a 
violation of constitutional rights. As the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals noted in Wall: 
It is now firmly established in this circuit that a 
teacher wrongfully discharged or denied employment 
... is in addition to equita91e remedies, entitled 
to an award of actual damages. 
Liability and Immunity under Section 1983 
Prior to 1969, in cases affecting school board mem-
bers, courts had awarded only equitable relief (forcing the 
defendant to take or refrain from taking action) as opposed 
to money damages. After 1969, federal district courts began 
to award personal damages against school board members for 
violating teachers' constitutional rights in cases challeng-
ing teacher dismissals and nonrenewals of teaching contracts. 
Lucia v. Duggan 8 and Chase v. Fall Mountain School District 9 
7Wall v. Stanley County Board of Education, 378 F. Zd 
275 (1967). 
8303 F. Supp. 112 (1969). 
9330 F. Supp. 388 (1971). 
are two cases that resulted in personal damages against 
school board members in 1969 and 1971. 
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In Lucia,, a 1969 Massachusetts case, a teacher was 
discharged for refusing to shave a beard he had grown over a 
vacation period. No prior policy relating to beards had been 
established by the board, nor was the plaintiff ever actually 
informed of the consequences of his failure to shave the 
beard. The federal court found that (1) the conduct of the 
school authorities had resulted in a denial of due process of 
law, (2) the school board did not dismiss in good faith, and 
(3) the members of the school board were individually liable 
for the plaintiff's lost wages and for compensatory damages 
of $1,000. 
In the 1971 Chase case, the federal court found the 
basis for the teacher's dismissal to be uninvestigated and 
evidenced by totally unsubstantiated charges of impropriety. 
Evidence in the case indicated that the teacher was actually 
discharged for criticizing certain board members. The court 
termed the nonrenewal to be a classic case of a violation of 
due process. Each board member who voted for nonrenewal was 
held personally liable for $2,240, the amount of salary lost 
by the teacher as a result of the board's action. 
Decisions of the late 1960's and early 1970's clearly 
established that board members and administrators, as in-
dividuals, are subject to the provisions of Section 1983. 
Board members and administrators were considered "persons" 
under Section 1983, and common law and statutory immunity did 
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not prevent actions against them. This principle was illus-
trated in a Kansas case10 in which a teacher claimed that his 
due process rights were violated because the board acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously by ignoring its own board policies 
which called for notice and hearing. The defendants' motion 
for dismissal of the complaint was refused on the grounds that 
the defendants were "persons" under Section 1983 and suit 
actions were unaffected by sovereign immunity. The plaintiff 
maintained that the actual reason for dismissal was his 
spanking of the superintendent's son. The case was settled 
out of court prior to trial with payment being made to the 
teacher. 
11 
Prior to the landmark Wood case which set forth a 
standard of liability for school officials under Section 1983, 
a board member's defense generally held up if he could show 
that he acted in "good faith" without malice or "ill will." 
This was articulated in a 1969 Seventh Circuit case, 
McLaughlin v. Tilendis. 12 The court ruled that officials who 
are defendants retain only qualified immunity dependent on 
good faith actions. 
Lower federal court decisions prior to 1975 did, how-
ever, reflect the lack of a clear standard concerning the 
immunity of school officials. The applications concerning 
immunity were often sporadic and inconsistent. There 
10 d" En 1cott v. Van Petten, 330 F. Supp. 378 (1971). 
11wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
12McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F. 2d 287 (1969). 
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appeared to be holdings on either side of every immunity 
issue under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
The immunity issue was examined in the student rights 
Supreme Court case, Wood v. Strickland. 13 In Wood the court 
addressed crucial Section 1983 questions: (1) how to define 
the liability of school board members and administrators under 
Section 1983; and (2) would school board members and adminis-
trators have the same immunity as they had under state law 
(that is, immunity except for acts shown by the plaintiff to 
have been out of malice or ill will)?14 
The Wood decision granted school officials the same 
qualified immunity as state executive officials as determined 
earlier in Scheurer v. Rhodes. 15 Scheurer was a Section 1983 
action against the governor and several Ohio national guards-
men involved in the 1970 Kent State University shooting. The 
1974 ruling held that the chief executive officer of the 
state, the senior and subordinate officers of the state's 
national guard, and the president of the state-controlled 
university only held entitlement to qualified, good faith 
immunity under Section 1983. The Supreme Court had earlier 
ruled that the immunity of judgesl6 and legislators17 had 
not been effected by Section 1983. 
13wood v. Strickland, 420 u.s. 308 (1975). 
14L. Lynn Hogue, "Board Member and Administrator Lia-
bility Since Wood v. Strickland," School Law Bulletin 7 (Octo-
ber 1976): 3. 
15scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
16Pierson v. Ray, U.S. 547 (1967). 
17renny v. Brandlove, 341 u.s. 367 (1951). 
The Supreme Court in Wood held that immunity from 
liability did depend on a board member's or administrator's 
good faith but that good faith consisted of both subjective 
factors (lack of malice or ill will) and objective factors 
(not violating settled constitutional rights). The Court 
explained: 
The official must himself be acting sincerely and with 
the belief that he is doing right, but an act violating 
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a student's constitutional rights can no more be justi-
fied by ignorance or disregard of settled undisputed law 
..• than the presence of actual malice. To be entitled 
to a special exemption from the categorical remedial 
language of Section 1983 . . . a school board member must 
be held to a standard of conduct based not only on per-
missible intentions, but also on knowledge of the ~gsic 
unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges. 
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that a school 
official could be liable for every action later found to have 
caused compensatory injury. Such action would have wreaked 
havoc in school administration by forcing school officials to 
guess the nature of emerging constitutional rights. The 
Supreme Court said: 
A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the 
school board has acted with such disregard of the stu-
dent's clearly established constitutional rights that 
his action can~~t reasonably be characterized as being 
in good faith. 
As individuals, both board members and administrators 
are immune from liability if they can show that their offi-
cial acts were taken without malice or ill will (subjective 
element) and in accordance with settled, indisputable 
18wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1925). 
19 rbid., pp. 320-321. 
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constitutional law. To prove actual malice under the subjec-
tive test has proven difficult. An example of what consti-
20 
tutes actual malice was provided by a Delaware case. A 
federal district court held that a superintendent's deliber-
ate infliction of injury on a nontenured school teacher by 
falsely accusing her of persistent insubordination precluded 
a finding of good faith. The court found that the superin-
tendent knew that the school board would rely on his evalua-
tion and would refuse to renew the teacher, thereby damaging 
her career. 
Plaintiffs did not need to allege hard-to-prove 
malice. If the plaintiff established that his rights had 
been violated and brought himself under the statute, the 
school official had to prove at trial that he acted in sin-
cere belief of the rightness of his action and in compliance 
with the requirements of the United States Constitution. The 
defense of a school official being sued under state tort law 
would be that his acts were those of a government officer, 
and that the plaintiff would have to prove malice or the ab-
sence of good faith on the school official's part. Qualified 
immunity differs from tort immunity in that the defendant 
must raise and prove his good faith as a defense. The de-
fense must be an affirmative defense and include a written 
answer to the complaint. 
20
Morris v. Bd. of Education, 401 F. Supp. 188 (1975). 
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Thomas A. Shannon, executive director of the National 
School Board Association, speaks eloquently to a Section 1983 
defense: 
The chilling aspect of defending against a Section 1983 
action is sorting out the burden of proof and the burden 
of "going forward" with proof. That is, if the base 
elements of Section 1983 are alleged in the complaint, 
the defendant should respond in his or her answer by 
pleading the defenses sufficient to exonerate him or her 
under Wood v. Strickland and to serve as the basis for 
carrying the burden of proof at trial if the plaintiff 
can make a prima facie showing and thus shift the b~Iden 
of "going forward" with the proof to the defendant. 
The standards in Wood by which the individual lia-
bility of public officials came to be measured, resulted in 
Section 1983 cases becoming more difficult to dispose of than 
under prior law. Subsequent decisions of the federal courts 
spoke to the questions of what are "settled, indisputed" 
constitutional rights as addressed in Wood. 
In Chaupoin v. Atkinson, the court said that Wood 
required that "action fbe] taken . within the bounds of 
d 
. 22 
reason un er all c1rcumstances." Board members and school 
officials must be aware of legal requirements and follow 
them: 
(T]here can be no immunity, even where the official has 
acted without intending to deprive the plaintiff of his 
constitutional rights, if a reasonable man in the defen-
dant's position would h~~e realized that his action 
would have that effect. 
21 Thomas A. Shannon, "The U. S. Civil Rights Act: A 
New Dimension in the Liability of Public School People," 
Current Legal Issues in Education, 1 (1977) 111. 
22 406 F. Supp. 32 (1975). 
23 Ibid., p. 35. 
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In a Nebraska teacher dismissal case, 24 the district 
court ruled that school officials were immune from liability 
for not giving a teacher a hearing because the established 
legal requirements were not clear. The court decided that 
the school officials could not be liable because they could 
not be required to know that informing a teacher of a right 
to a hearing did not entitle them to assume that an absence 
of a request by the teacher for a hearing relieved them of 
the duty of giving the teacher a hearing. The district court 
ruled that future boards would be required to use this new 
knowledge of constitutional law in granting hearings to 
teachers. What the court was expressing was that one board's 
immunity may be the next board's liability. 
This notion of one free constitutional violation was 
rebuked in a search-and-seizure case. 25 Acting on a tele-
phone tip that led a school principal to suspect that three 
junior high students possessed drugs, the principal requested 
the police to be present when the students were searched. 
After the arrival of the police, the principal ordered a 
school nurse and a school psychologist to search the students 
for illegal drugs. No drugs were found, and one student 
brought Section 1983 action charging violation of the stu-
dent's Fourth Amendment rights. At the time of this opinion, 
there were no prior cases involving a civil rights action for 
damages against a school principal arising from search of a 
24 Brown v. Bathke, 416 F. Supp. 1194 (1976). 
25 Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (1976). 
student. Despite this lack of precedent, the court ruled 
that there was still a legal basis for putting the issue of 
liability to a jury. The court said: 
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Under Wood v. Strickland, school officials are immune 
from acts which do not violate settled, undisputed cons-
titutional law, as long as actions are not taken malici-
ously. (l)n terms of the policies set forth in Wood, it 
appears that law can be settled without there haVIng 
been a specific case with identical facts which was de-
cided adversely to school officials. There is a limita-
tion to the notion that school officials can have one 
"free" constitutional violation before they are liable 
for ignoring constitutional rights that arise in each 
unique factual setting.26 
The court, in denying the school officials' motion for a 
directed verdict, held that freedom from unreasonable search 
was a settled, undisputed right. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals read the "settled, 
undisputed law" more literally in Sapp v. Renfroe. 27 The 
court ruled that the Decatur City Board of Education had not 
v"iolated the consti tntional rights of the plaintiff due to 
the absence of an authoritative decision from the United 
States Supreme Court or from the Court of Appeals in the 
Fifth or other circuits. The case resulted from the denial 
of the plaintiff's admission to Decatur High School due to 
the plaintiff's refusal to participate in R.O.T.C. military 
training. 
Despite the Picha ruling, it is the writer's opinion 
that there is no "settled, undisputed law" if there are dif-
fering opinions among appellate courts on a subject. If 
26 rbid., p. 35. 
27511 F. 2d 172 (1925). 
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courts below the United States Supreme Court have differing 
views on a particular issue, that issue is not settled. 
The Wood standard necessitating "settled, undisputed 
law" applied to teacher dismissal in Bertot v. School Dis-
28 
trict No. 1. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals observed: 
The recent decision in Wood . • . has defined the im-
munity defense in the specific context of school disci-
pline. Due to the similarity of the discretionary 
authority exercised by local school officials in student 
discipline and teacher employment matters, we feel the 
immunity test there ~~ated should apply in a case [of 
teacher nonrenewal]. 
Mrs. Bertot, a Wyoming public school teacher, claimed that 
the nonrenewal of her contract was in retaliation for the 
exercise of her First Amendment rights. Mrs. Bertot had par-
ticipated in establishing an underground newspaper. In look-
ing at the subjective element of Wood first, the jury 
decided that the school officials had acted in good faith and 
had not acted maliciously. The court then looked to the cons-
titutional law on the First Amendment. This examination 
addressed the objective element of the Wood standard. The 
court concluded: 
At the time of the 1971 nonrenewal of Mrs. Bertot's con-
tract, Roth and Sinderman had not been decided and our 
controlling decis1on was Jones v. Hopper . . . There a 
similar constitutional claim of unlawful termination of 
an untenured instructor's employment because {of his 
role, among other things, is the founding of] an inde-
pendent faculty-student publication was rejected for 
failure to state a claim . . . Hence, we cannot say 
the defendants knew or reasonably should have known that 
their actions would violate constitutional rights.~O 
28 sz2 F. 2d 1171 (1975). 
29 Ibid., p. 1183. 
30 Ibid., p. 1185. 
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With the objective element of the case settled, the personal 
liability of the individual school board members was re-
solved. The court, however, now raised the question con-
cerning the liability of the school board members in their 
official capacities or the board's liability as an entity 
which will be examined later in this study. 
Another con~ervative application of the Wood formula 
31 
for assessing liability occurred in a maternity case. The 
issue was the Chagrin Falls school board's requirement that 
a teacher must resign and her contract would become null and 
void at the end of the fifth month of pregnancy or at the 
end of the first semester whichever occurred first. The 
teacher's request to resign at the end of her fifth month of 
pregnancy (March 1) rather than at the end of the first 
semester was rejected by the board. The teacher then re-
signed at the end of the first semester but brought suit 
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the pregnancy 
policy discriminated against her as a female employee in 
violation of the United States Constitution. 
The issue at the trial was whether the school board 
should have known that their pregnancy policy was unconsti-
tutional in light of the Supreme Court ruling in Cleveland 
32 
Board of Education v. LaFleur. The district court awarded 
Mrs. Shirley back pay (from the end of first semester, 
31
shirley v. Chagrin Falls Exempted Village School 
Board of Education, 521 F. 2d 1329 (1975). 
32 414 u.s. 632 (1974). 
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January 28, until the end of fifth month of pregnancy, March 
1) plus interest. The basis of the decision was that the end 
of the semester provision was adopted by the board for its 
own convenience and that the policy was arbitrary. This de-
cision was reversed even though the district court had up-
held a similar policy in LaFleur minus the end of the seme-
ster clause. 
The court of appeals reversed on the basis that there 
were no binding judicial decisions in conflict with the Cha-
grin Falls policy. The Sixth Circuit found good faith immun-
ity noting that the only case holding that such a requirement 
was unconstitutional at that time3 3 was in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, and was not constitutionally binding as 
creating a clear constitutional right. The court stated: 
(A]t the time the Board decision was made, there had in 
fact been no adjudication binding on the Board that its 
existing pregnant policy was unconstitutional, let alone 
unquestionably so. To compel the Board members to re-
spond personally in damages in such circumstances would 
be to hold that they were charged wiSh predicting the 
future course of constitutional law. ~ 
One note of interest at this point is that the more 
liberal Cohen ruling 35 of the Virginia district court was up-
h ld b th F h Co 
0 36 d h • e y e ourt 1rcu1t an t e reason1ng was later 
33cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. 
Supp. 1159 (1971). 
34shirley v. Chagrin Falls Exempted Village School 
Board of Education, 521 F. 2d 1329 (1975). 
35cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. 
Supp. 1159 (1971). 
36cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 474 F. 
2d 395 (1973). 
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upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur. 37 In LaFleur the United States 
Supreme Court held that a mandatory maternity policy violated 
the due process clause of the Constitution. 
Another Fourth Circuit interpretation of Section 1983 
was a ruling concerning a class action brought on behalf of 
all pregnant teachers against school boards with allegedly 
d . . . . 1 1" . 38 1scr1m1natory matern1ty eave po 1c1es. The court ruled 
that good faith immunity was not a defense in a suit for back 
pay, which was a vital part of the equitable remedy for rein-
d 1 . f d 39 statement an not mere y a su1t or amages. 
First Amendment Rights 
A North Dakota case40 has provided a judicial guide 
for proper procedural due process based on the Wood guide-
lines. An unmarried teacher was discharged for living with 
her boyfriend in a mobile home furnished by the school dis-
trict. 
After protests from parents, the principal tried to 
solve the problem informally. Ms. Sullivan told the princi-
pal that she believed her living arrangement was a private 
concern. The principal then told Ms. Sullivan that she would 
37 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632 (1974). 
38 
Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (1975). 
39 Ibid., p. 447. 
40sullivan v. Meade· Independent School District No. 
101,530 F. 2d 799 (1976). 
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be fired if the living arrangement continued. The board in-
formed Ms. Sullivan that a hearing would be held based on the 
superintendent's recommendation that she be dismissed for 
gross immorality and incompetency. The incompetency charge 
was added because the board reasoned that the tainted reputa-
tion resulting from the immoral acts destroyed the teacher's 
effectiveness in the classroom. At the hearing, at which Ms. 
Sullivan was represented by counsel, the board members 
offered to transfer her to another school if she would alter 
her living arrangements. Ms. Sullivan refused and was dis-
missed. 
Ms. Sullivan brought suit claiming that her First 
Amendment rights to privacy and freedom of association and 
her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and protection 
had been violated. District Court dismissed the action and 
on appeal, the appeals court held that the board members had 
acted in good faith by weighing the competing and conflicting 
constitutional rights, none of which were absolute. The 
court in applying the guidelines of Wood held that good faith 
immunity standards had been met by (1) acting without malice, 
(2) balancing the constitutional rights of the teacher 
against the welfare of the school community, and (3) not de-
priving the teacher of established, or unquestioned constitu-
tional rights. The right for unmarried persons to live 
together was found not to be a "settled, undisputed constitu-
tional right." 
49 
Although an individual's right to privacy was not 
clearly defined, a Wyoming teacher succeeded in a Section 
1983 action against board members and the superintendent on 
this ground. 41 Lack of discipline, untidiness in the class-
room and inadequate teaching performance were cited as the 
reasons for dismissal. Instead the court determined that the 
teacher's physical size, lack of church attendance, the loca-
tion of her trailer, and the conduct of her personal life 
were the reasons for dismissal. The constitutional right of 
an individual's privacy to be free from unwarranted govern-
1 . . . d 42 menta 1ntrus1on was c1te • 
Thirty-three thousand dollars compensatory damages 
were awarded the teacher since the court determined that the 
school officials had not acted in good faith. No punitive 
damages were awarded since it was not shown that the defen-
dants acted with malice. 43 The Wood guidelines for good 
faith were not met by the school officials; therefore, the 
liability was clearly defined. 
I h h d
. . 1 44 . . n anot er teac er 1sm1ssa case concern1ng F1rst 
Amendment rights, the evidence established that three proba-
tionary teachers were not renewed because the teachers spoke 
out at public meetings in opposition to board policies and 
4lstoddard v. School District No. 1, 429 F. Supp. 
890 (1977). 
42 stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
43 Ibid. 
44Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F. Zd 275 (1978). 
so 
practices. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the teachers' rein-
statements and remanded for redetermination of compensatory 
damages and attorneys' fees. 
The United States Supreme Court established a new 
standard for adjudicating cases with alleged First Amendment 
45 
violations in Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle. Fred 
Doyle, the plaintiff, was an untenured teacher who had served 
as president and as a member of the executive committee of 
the local teachers' organization. Doyle and another teacher 
were suspended for an altercation during a heated argument. 
Doyle's suspension resulted in a walk-out by several union 
members. Doyle also clashed with cafeteria workers over the 
amount of spaghetti served him. On another occasion Doyle 
referred to students as "sons of bitches" and made obscene 
gestures to two girls who would not follow his commands. The 
last incident concerned Doyle's phoning a radio station to 
convey the substance of a memorandum relating teachers' dress 
to public support of a bond issue. The radio announced the 
adoption of the dress code as a news item. 
The federal district and the Sixth Court of Appeals 
ruled that the telephone call was an exercise of Doyle's 
First Amendment right of expression. The Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the case with directions. Justice 
William Rehnquist's opinion states the standard for adjudi-
eating First Amendment cases: 
45 429 u.s. 274, 279 (1977). 
Initially . . . the burden was properly placed upon re-
spondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally 
protected, and that this conduct was a "substantial 
factor" in the Board's decision not to rehire him. 
Respondent having carried that burden, however, the Dis-
trict Court should have gone on to determine whether the 
Board had shown by a preponderance of evidence that it 
would have reached the same decision as to respondent's 
emplo4~ent even in the absence of the protected con-
duct. 
This ruling prevents employees and pupils from using the 
exercise of a constitutional right to block school officials 
when legitimate reasons exist for dismissal or expulsion. 
This standard was applied by the Supreme Court in 
Wagle v. Murray. 47 At the district court level the jury had 
awarded a teacher $50,000 for free speech violations; the 
judge held for the board notwithstanding the verdict. On 
appeal, the court of appeals reversed and the board then 
successfully petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court 
51 
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Mt. 
Healthy. 48 On remand, the court of appeals gave instructions 
to the jury: 
Required the appellant to show by a preponderance of 
evidence that his contract would have been renewed 
except for t~g exercise of constitutionally protected 
rights . . . 
46 Ibid., p. 577. 
47p. 2d 1329 (1976). 
48Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
49wagle v. Murray, F. 2d 401, 403 (1977). 
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The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the 
jury's finding that the teachers would not have been dismiss-
ed in the absence of the protected First Amendment conduct. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Procedural Due Process 
The issue of whether teachers have protected Four-
teenth Amendement, property or liberty interestsSO that 
entitle them to full due process hearings before dismissal 
continued to be a heavily litigated issue. School officials 
have been held liable for damages in situations where failure 
to provide due process was the source of injury to the 
individual. 
An illustration of this situation is the 1977 case, 
Bogart v. Unified School District. 51 Bogart, the plaintiff, 
was a Kansas tea=her and the £at~er of a teen~age son. The 
son called home and told his father that he had been appre-
hended by the sheriff who had a warrant to search the house. 
The father asked the son if there was anything illegal in the 
house and the son indicated there was some marijuana in a 
dresser in his room. The father removed the marijuana from 
the son's dresser in an attempt to protect the son but de-
cided to turn it over to the sheriff when he arrived. The 
sheriff then arrested Bogart for illegal possession. 
SOu. S. Canst. amendement XIV, sec. 1. 
Sl432 F. Supp. 895 (1977). 
53 
The school immediately suspended Bogart and scheduled 
a hearing but gave no reasons. At the hearing Bogart was in-
formed that dismissal was being considered due to the crimi-
nal charges against him. Bogart argued that he did not smoke 
marijuana or advocate its use; furthermore, his students 
understood his stand on drug abuse. Therefore, his teaching 
effectiveness could not be impaired. The board voted to con-
tinue the suspension pending the outcome of the trial, but 
later granted reinstatement after a three-month court delay. 
Bogart was found guilty as charged by the jury when his trial 
was held. 
Despite the notification of a pending appeal, the 
school board voted to dismiss Bogart without further notice 
or appeal. The following months the judge ordered acquittal 
notwithstanding the verdict. The school board refused to re-
consider the dismissal. The courts found that both Bogart's 
"property" and "liberty" interests had been violated. Bogart 
had a "property" interest in employment by virtue of a state 
law and a "liberty" interest that had been violated because 
the publicity given the nonrenewal stigmatized him and fore-
closed Bogart's freedom to take advantage of other employment 
opportunities within a reasonable driving distance. The 
court awarded $4,695 back pay on his teaching contract, and 
$500 back pay of bus driver's salary for the year of discharge 
and $31,284 for the next three years, and eight per cent in-
terest in these amounts. 
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A 1978 student rights case, Carey v. Piphus 52 struck 
directly at the procedural due process question in teacher 
dismissal. The action arose from the suspension, without due 
process hearings, of two male Chicago students for 20 days 
each, one for smoking marijuana and the other for wearing a 
gold earring. The students filed Section 1983 suits alleg-
ing that even though they could not prove that they suffered 
any actual harm from the suspension, they were entitled to 
monetary damages for mental and emotional distress. The 
trial court disagreed and dismissed the complaint although 
it ruled that the suspensions should be removed from the stu-
dents' rec0rds. 
01! appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that even if the suspension were fully justified and even if 
no actual harm was suffered by the students, they were still 
entitled to collect substantial monetary damages because 
their constitutional due process rights were denied. This 
holding was in line with a previous ruling, Hostrap v. Board 
53 
of Junior College District No. 515. Hostrap was a case in 
which the dismissal of a junior college president, Hostrap, 
was justifiable; however, damages were awarded for infringe-
ment on Hostrap's constitutional right to two elements of 
procedural due process - notice and a hearing. Determination 
of damages was ordered to be based on the nature of the 
52 carey v. Piphus, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978). 
515, 
53 . 
Hostrap v. Board of Junior College District No. 
523 F. 2d 569 (1975) cert denied 425 U.S. 963, 1976. 
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deprivation, the magnitude of Hostrap's mental distress and 
humiliation, and any other injury resulting from his depriva-
tion of rights protected by the Constitution. 
The reasoning of appellate court and the reasoning of 
Hostrapwererejected by the United States Supreme Court. 
Justice Lewis Powell in writing the unanimous decision stated: 
In sum, then, although mental and emotional distress 
caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is 
compensable under Section 1983, we hold that neither the 
likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving 
it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory 
damages 5lithout proof that such injury actually was caused. 
If the individual seeking to collect monetary damages for 
emotional and mental distress caused by constitutional depri-
vation, can prove actual damage by the constitutional depri-
vation act, then the individual is entitled to be compensated 
for the injury. In absence of such proof, the individual is 
entitled to collect nominal damages, which the Supreme Court 
set at one dollar. The justification of this principle was 
stated: 
By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for 
nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law 
recognizes the importance to organized society that those 
rights be scrupulously observed: but at the same time, 
it remains true to the principle that substantial damages 
should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in 
the case of exemplary or punitive damagSS' to deter or 
punish malicious deprivation of rights. 
The Supreme Court saw the purpose of Section 1983 as a means 
to compensate the victim of a constitutional deprivation, not 
54 Carey v. Piphus, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978). 
55 Ib1·d., OS p. 1 4. 
as a means to punish the wrongdoer beyond the amount of the 
victim's compensation. 56 
The Carey decision has had a definite effect on 
teacher dismissal because the legal principles are the same 
56 
for teachers and students. When procedural due process rights 
were not followed, teachers have been awarded back pay from 
the time of the termination as damages. Back pay has even 
been awarded when there was just cause for dismissal but due 
process was not followed. In applying the Carey principle, 
it seems reasonable to assume that teachers are entitled to 
only nominal damages when denied adequate procedural due 
process in the dismissal process when just cause is evident. 
Back pay and damages are not awarded under such circumstances. 
The damages that the teacher can receive are based solely on 
mental and emotional distress that resulted directly from the 
denial of adequate due process. This ruling has the poten-
tial to substantially reduce the financial liability risk of 
school officials. 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
School districts have often attempted to invoke the 
immunity protection of the Eleventh Amendment in Section 1983 
actions. This constitutional provision precludes suit by a 
citizen of one state against another state without its 
56
Thornas J. Flygare, "Section 1983 Suits Against 
School Districts: The Supreme Court Speaks," Phi Delta 
Kappan 60 (October 1978): 128. 
57 
consent. An 1890 decision 57 also precluded suits against a 
state by a resident of that state without consent. Suit by 
private parties against the states and their agencies with-
out their consent was prohibited by the Supreme Court in the 
1974 case Edelman v. Jordan
58 
and reaffirmed more recently in 
the 1978 ruling Alabama v. Pugh. 59 
Courts have looked at a number of factors in deter-
mining whether a school district is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Courts have examined whether the state 
is the "real party in interest," using such factors as whether 
the judgment will have to be paid from the state treasury, 
whether the school board performs a governmental or proprie-
tary function, whether it has been separately incorporated, 
whether it has autonomy over its operations, whether it has 
the power to sue and be sued and to enter into contracts, 
whether its property is immune from state taxation, and 
whether the state immunized itself from responsibility for 
the operation of the school district. 
60 In a 1975 Delaware case, teachers were awarded re-
instatement and back pay due to the court's finding that the 
district was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In 
determining the status of the school district, the court 
423 (D. 
57 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
58 Edelman v. Jordan, 414 U.S. 651 (1974). 
59Alabama v. Pugh, 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978). 
6 °K· C d 1ng v. aesar Roney School District, 396 F. Supp. 
Del. 19 7 5) . 
58 
observed the following: (1) The school district is clearly 
defined by Delaware state law to be a geographical unit or-
ganized for administering public education. (2) The school 
board has the power to contract and control property and 
funds for the school district. (3) It has the power to col-
lect and levy taxes, although it does receive money from the 
state. (4) Teachers are hired and dismissed by the school 
board and not by the state board of education, and appeal is 
to the Superior Court, not to a state administrative agency. 61 
The factors were the basis for the suit for reinstatement 
being brought against the school district and not the state. 
Back pay was determined to come from the school dis-
trict. The court found that the school district has the 
power to tax for school purposes and since it has the power 
to be sued on its contracts~ "it logically follows that sat-
isfaction of a contract suit judgment constitutes a school 
62 purpose." 
In a Fourth District case, 63 a teacher alleged that 
her discharge was racially motivated and sought reinstate-
ment and back pay. The decision included the finding that 
the school district was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. The court ruled that the school board's action 
may have been described as a "state action" but the school 
district was not a state defendant. 
61 Ibid., 205. 
62 Ibid. 
63 
Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School 
District, 521 F. Zd 1201 (1975). 
59 
In Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle, 64 the United 
States Supreme Court clearly established the status of school 
districts in most states. In reference to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, the opinion is as follows: 
The issue here turns on whether the Mt. Healthy Board of 
Education is to be treated as an arm of the state ... , 
or is to be treated as a municipal corporation or other 
political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment 
does not apply. (A) local school board such as the 
petitioner is more like a county or city than it is like 
an arm of the state ... (I)t was not entitled to 
assert any Elevg~th Amendment immunity from suits in the 
federal courts. 
Also Eleventh Amendment immunity was found not to bar assess-
ment of attorneys' fees against state officials. The Supreme 
Court approved the award of attorneys' fees against a state 
official under Title VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 66 There remains some doubt as to the 
applicability of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in a few 
states where school districts do not have corporate status. 
The question is, however, again before the Supreme Court in 
Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College. 67 
This case will be discussed later in the study. 
Statute of Limitations 
The United States Civil Rights Act did not set a 
limitation period for the liability of improper actions. In 
64Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education 
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
65 b"d I 1 • , 573. 
66 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976). 
67 431 F. Supp. 1379 (1977). 
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a 1914 case, O'Sullivan v. Felix
68 
the United States Supreme 
Court held that relevant state statutes of limitations were 
applicable. Generally, these state statutes hold administra-
tors and board members liable for three years. In North 
Carolina this is the case. 69 
The limitation may run longer, however, since it is 
measured from the time the plaintiff learns of the injury. 
In a 1975 North Carolina case, 70 the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that a claim must be filed within 
three years of the discovery of the injury. An action for 
damages was filed by a lady as a result of a sterilization 
operation. The operation had been performed ten years 
earlier in compliance with a North Carolina statute that was 
no longer in effect at the time suit was filed. She contend-
ed the original statute was unconstitutional. The claim was 
held not to be time-barred since the claim was filed within 
three years of the initial discovery of the sterilization 
and its permanency. 
Exhaustion of Remedies 
Generally, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust 
state judicial or administrative remedies before bringing 
federal suit for damages under Section 1983. In Monroe v. 
Pape, 71 the United States Supreme Court said that "the 
68233 u.s. 318 (1914). 
69 N. C. General Statute 1-15(2) (1975). 
70cox v. Stanton, 529 F. 2d 47 (1975). 
71
365 u.s. 169 (1961). 
federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy and the 
latter need not be first sought and refused before the 
federal one is invoked." 72 
In certain cases, however, plaintiffs have been re-
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quired to pursue available means of correcting or redressing 
wrongs either through proper administrative channels or 
state courts before bringing federal action. An example of 
this occurred in a 1975 New York case 73 involving a superin-
tendent who brought Section 1983 in federal district court 
seeking preliminary and injunctive relief against his suspen-
sion without pay. The school board brought forty-one charges 
against him. The board granted the superintendent a hearing 
before a trial examiner appointed by the board, with full 
notice and right to counsel. The superintendent agreed that 
he preferred a federal answer to the litigation based on pre-
vious language in Monroe. The court disagreed and ordered 
the plaintiff to exhaust speedy and effective administrative 
remedies first. The court felt the hearing would be fair and 
the plaintiff would still have the right to appeal to the 
city board or the chancellor. 
Section 1983 lawsuits can be filed in either federal 
or state court of general jurisdiction. Since the United 
States Civil Rights Act does not contain any exclusive grant 
of jurisdiction to federal courts, both court systems can 
adjudicate federal causes of action. 
aff'd. 
72 Ibid., p. 169. 
73Fuentes v. Rohr, 395 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y.), 
519 F. 2d 379 (1975). 
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Attorneys' Fees 
Another element in considering damages in Section 
1983 is whether the prevailing party should be awarded attor-
neys' fees. While there is no provision in the United States 
Civil Rights Act to provide an award of attorneys' fees for 
successful litigation of Section 1983 action, federal courts 
have granted such awards on three bases; 
(a) The "unreasonable and obdurately obstinate" behavior 
standard, under which attorney fees are awarded to a 
successful party when his opponent had acted "in bad 
faith, voraciously, wantonly, or for oppressive 
reasons"; 
(b) The "benefit standard, which involves litigation in 
which the successful plaintiff confers a benefit 
upon a known class of persons and the awarding court 
has sufficiently broad jurisdiction to spread the 
costs of litigation among the class"; and, 
(c) "Private attorney general" standard, under which 
private parties are awarded attorneys' fees because 
their successful litigation has aided "in effectu'Ji-
ing important congressional and public policies." 
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court eliminated 
the "private attorney" standaTd in Alyeska Pipeline Service 
v. Wilderness Society. 75 In response to the Supreme Court's 
limitation on attorney fees~ Congress adopted the Civil 
Rights' Attorneys' Fees and Award Act of 1976. This Act was 
an amendment of 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 and as amended provides: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 
Section 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this Title, Title 
74 Tom Shannon, "The U. S. Civil Rights Act: A New 
Dimension in the Liability of Public School People, 1976 
Current Issues in Education: 113. 
75Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Wilderness Society, 
421 u.s. 240 (1975). 
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IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or pro-
ceeding by or on behalf of the United States of America, 
to enforce, or charging the violations of, ... Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ... the Court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other 
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as 
part of the costs. 76 
Earlier, in the 1968 Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc. , 77 the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
bad faith requirement for awarding attorneys' fees. Conse-
quently, any finding of a constitutional violation entitles 
the plaintiff to attorneys' fees. Apparently, the attorneys' 
fees award is independent of the compensation for proven in-
h d . . h 78 h jury. For example, t e stu ents 1n Carey v. P1p us, w o 
were denied proper procedural due process but were awarded 
only one dollar in nominal damages, were entitled to sub-
stantially more in attorneys' fees. 
In contrast to this, if a defendant prevails in a 
civil rights action, he is not entitled to attorneys' fees 
unless he can establish that the plaintiff's suit was "un-
reasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious or that the 
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became 
"79 . f so. Th1s ruling made it almost impossible for de endants 
to obtain attorneys' fees. 
76 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 as amended. 
77 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964 (1968). 
78 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978). 
79christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 98 S. Ct. 694, 
701 (1978). 
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The possibility of attorneys' fees being awarded must 
be considered by school officials in deciding whether cases 
should be pursued or settled. The possibility of p~ying both 
the prevailing plaintiff's attorneys' fees and their own may 
cause boards of education to hesitate to dismiss that incom-
petent teacher who needs to be dismissed. The possibility of 
being awarded attorneys' fees if the plaintiff prevails is 
certainly a factor in a teacher's decision to litigate or not 
litigate his dismissal. 
Liability of School Officials in Their 
Official Capacities or as Entities 
As discussed earlier, the 1961 case, Monroe v. Pape, 
opened the federal judiciary to suits against public 
officials based on U.S.C. Section 1983. The Monroe ruling 
did, however, create a state of confusion with the deter-
mination that no monetary recovery was possible under Section 
1983 against any local government agency or its officers in 
their official capacities. Section 1983 states that "any 
person" who deprives another of his federal constitutional 
rights shall be liable to the injured party. The Monroe 
decision held that municipalities were not "persons" under 
Section 1983 and therefore, immune from suit. This concept 
was later upheld in two Supreme Court cases. In City of 
81 Kenosha v. Bruno, a municipality was ruled not a 
80 365 u.s. 169 (1961). 
81412 u.s. 507 (1973). 
"person" under Section 1983 even for injunctive relief. In 
82 Moor v. County of Alameda, a county government was ruled 
not a "person" under Section 1983. 
A 1975 Fifth Circuit case, Adkins v. Duval County 
School Board 83 dealt with the issue that a school district 
cannot be sued under Section 1983 because of the "not a 
person" clause. The Adkins court cited Monroe, Kenosha and 
Moor and denied jurisdiction on the ground that under Flor-
ida law there was no distinction between a Florida school 
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board as a governmental entity and a Florida county or munic-
ipality. The court saw all three being created by the state 
constitution and allowe~ to tax and exercise governmental 
powers for their respective purposes. Florida state statutes 
also designated school boards, counties and cities as a "body 
corporate" for purposes of initiating and defending suits. 
Suits against a school board, therefore, could only be liti-
gated as would suits against a city or county entity. 
Most often plaintiffs alleging constitutional wrong-
doings sued individuals in an attempt to obtain injunctive 
relief and damages directly from the individuals and in-
directly from the school district. This was not always the 
case. Two actions in the Fourth Circuit illustrated that 
different answers can be given to the same question under 
different circumstances. In the 1975 case of Burt v. Board 
of Trustees of Edgefield City School District, 84 the Fourth 
82 411 u.s. 693 (1973). 
83 511 F. 2d 690 (1975). 
84 521 F. 2d 1201 (1975). 
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Circuit ruled that the school district was not a "person" and 
hence not subject to suit under Section 1983. In this case a 
discharged teacher sought reinstatement and back pay alleging 
that her dismissal was racially motivated. 
In a 1975 maternity case 85 in the Fourth Circuit, the 
court held that school board members, when sued in their 
official capacities, are persons under Section 1983, whether 
the suits are for monetary or injunctive relief. The court 
stated that a contrary finding would "emasculate" the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871. 86 
Another 1975 case, Bertot v. School District No. 1, 87 
also imposed liability on board members in their official 
capacities. As discussed earlier, Bertot was a First Amend-
ment teacher dismissal case. In examining the Wood objective 
and subjective elements, the court found the school board en-
titled to the defense of good faith immunity as individual 
board members. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
that Mrs. Bertot's First Amendment rights had been violated 
and for this constitutional violation the trial court should 
impose liability on the board members in their official ca-
pacities or on the board as an entity. 
In Hostrap v. Board of Junior College District No. 
515, 88 discussed earlier, the court ruled that even though 
85
Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (1975). 
86 rbid., p. 447. 
87 522 F. 2d 1171 (1971). 
88 
Hostrap v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 
523 F. Zd 569 (1975). 
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the board members had the defense of good faith immunity, the 
board as a corporate body was not entitled to immunity and 
was subject to suit as an entity. Hostrap's constitutional 
right to due process had been violated and even though the 
board members' actions were taken in good faith, the board 
itself was liable. The case was remanded for damages by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This ruling indicated that 
board members who are sued in their official capacities or as 
a public entity are not entitled to prove their immunity with 
a good faith defense. Consequently, a plaintiff could sue 
regardless of whether or not the constitutional violation was 
a matter of "settled, indisputed law" when the injury occur-
red. Suits against boards of education as entities would not 
have to be based on a violation of "settled, indisputable 
law" or violations of "clearly established constitutional 
rights." 89 
The Bertot and Hostrap rulings were not the norm but 
more the exception. Most cases held that school boards and 
districts are not "persons" within the meaning of Section 
1983. A 1971 United States Supreme Court decision in Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics90 did provide a legal theory with which plaintiffs 
could sue school boards directly. Bivens determined that 
when constitutional rights were violated, the injured person 
could sue on the basis of the Constitution itself. Lawsuits 
89wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
90 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
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based on the Constitution must exceed $10,000 and have juris-
diction applied under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. At the time of 
the ruling, this was the only method that plaintiffs could 
use to sue school boards as defendants. Section 1983 suits 
could be for less than $10,000 but plaintiffs could only sue 
individual board members and officials. 
Even litigation under Section 1331 has been unclear. 
A nontenured teacher in Oklahoma alleged the nonrenewal of 
her contract was based on her communications with a teachers' 
organization. 
91 
The district court rejected jurisdiction 
over the school board under either Section 1983 or Section 
1331. The court identified the school board not to be a 
"person" under Section 1983 and thus damages and injunctive 
relief were not available. Jurisdiction could not be based 
on Section 1331 since the question of nonrenewal arose under 
state, not federal law. 
The United States Supreme Court made some progress 
toward answering the question of municipal liability under 
Section 1983 with the June 6, 1978 ruling Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services of City of New York. 92 The suit 
involved litigation for back pay by employees who were re-
quired to take maternity leave at an arbitrary point during 
pregnancy. Suit was brought against the governmental agencies 
directly and the agency heads in their official capacities 
rather than suing the agency heads as private individuals. 
23 of 
91Fanning v. School Board of Indep. School 
Jefferson City, 395 F. Supp. 18 (1975). 
92
98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). 
Dist. No. 
In response to Cleveland v. LaFleur,
93 
which held such 
forced-leave policies unconstitutional, the New York policy 
was changed, but this was after the suit was filed and the 
employee-plaintiffs continued to press the back pay portion 
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of the claim. At issue was whether damages could be assessed 
against the New York Department of Social Services as well 
as against the individual officials in their official capa-
cities. The district court and the Second Court of Appeals 
followed the precedent of Monroe v. Pape 94 and held that no 
monetary recovery was possible under Section 1983 against any 
local government agency or its officers in their official 
capacities. This reasoning was based on the holding in Monroe 
that a municipality was not a "person" within the meaning of 
Section 1983. The Monell court found the Monroe ruling in 
error according to legislative history and overruled in a 7-2 
decision. The ruling spoke directly to the immunity question: 
Local governmental bodies, therefore, can be sued directly 
under Section 1983 for monetary declaratory or injunctive 
relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be 
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, 
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 
promulgated by that body's officers ... [and] ... may 
be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant 
to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not 
received formal approval ~~rough the body's official 
decision-making channels. 
Justice William Brennan wrote the majority opinion in 
Monell and justified overruling Monroe on three grounds. 
93c1eveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632 (1974). 
vices, 
94Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 169 (1961). 
95Monell v. New York City Department of Social Ser-
98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). 
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First, re-examination of the congressional debate on Section 
1983 indicates that the Monroe decision misread the legisla-
tive history. The Monell ruling determined that the Forty-
second Congress did intend municipalities to be encompassed 
within the term "person" used in Section 1983. Secondly, the 
Monroe decision has never been a clear precedent. An illus-
tration of this has been the willingness of the Supreme Court 
to permit Section 1983 litigation against school boards in a 
number of desegregation suits. Also Congress has condoned 
Section 1983 liability of school boards by passing laws that 
provided the school districts financial aid to carry out 
court orders. Thirdly, Congress through the Civil Rights 
Attorneys' Fees Act has recently established a degree of lia-
bility for local school boards. If the plaintiff prevails in 
Section 1983 action, the school board is liable for attorneys' 
fees. 96 
Stated simply, the Monell decision defines governmen-
tal bodies as "persons" under Section 1983 and liable for 
acts committed in the enforcement of unconstitutional 
policies. The court rejected the respondeat superior theory, 
a common-law doctrine holding the amnlnva? ?~~nnn~ihlp ~nT '-"~••.t' .... -J "" ..... --r-··----- ---
the mistakes of an employee if the employee believed he was 
pursuing the employer's business. The majority opinion 
stated: 
In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be 
held liable solely because it employs a tort feasor - or, 
96Anne M. Dellinger, "School Boards May Be Sued and 
Found Liable in Section 1983 Suits," School Law Bulletin 4 
(October 1978): 17. 
in other words, a municipality cannot be held liab19 7 under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. 
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Section 1983 liability on a local government occurs only when 
an official policy or custom followed by an employee violates 
another's constitutional rights. Governmental liability 
occurs if a school board adopts an unconstitutional policy or 
allows the practice of an unconstitutional custom. School 
boards retained the immunity of Monroe for acts of an employee 
which go beyond official policy or custom. Custom is defined 
as "deeply imbedded traditional ways of carrying out state 
policies" or practices of state officials which are permanent 
and settled. 98 
The court left unanswered the question of whether 
governments retain some kind of immunity that will protect 
them from Section 1983 litigation even though they are con-
sidered "persons" who may be sued. The court skirted the 
issue of affording some form of official immunity by stating: 
"We have no occasion to address, and do not address vvhat the 
full contours of municipal liability under Section 1983 may 
be. 99 
Justice Lewis Powell did suggest, however, that some 
qualified immunity for governments might exist: 
In any event, the possibility of a qualified immunity, as 
to which the court reserves decision, may remove some of 
the harshness of liability for good faith failure to 
vices, 
97Monell v. New York City Department of Social Ser-
98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). 
98 Ibid., p. 2036. 
99 
Ibid., p. 2038. 
predict the often uncertain course of constitutional 
adjudication.lOU 
The Monell ruling opens the door for suits against 
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the financial resources of municipalities and school boards. 
Possibly a lesser degree of wrongful action is necessary to 
be proven against a governmental body than an individual. 
Judges and juries may view the financial resources of a school 
district or municipality differently than the personal finan-
cial resources of a school official. Certainly there will be 
more suits filed against governmental agencies and fewer 
against individual defendants. 
The liability for customs should provide governmental 
bodies the initiative to enact legally acceptable policies, 
whereby employees can function with a lesser probability of 
violating the constitutional rights of the public. 
The full impact of Monell will await further litiga-
tion. Monell left unclear the question of who on the govern-
mental hierarchy has the authority to create policy for which 
the body may be held liable. The Supreme Court will soon ad-
dress the question of the status and responsibility of 
employees in making official policies. 
The case, Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg 
101 State College, arose with the dismissal without due pro-
cess of a nontenured teacher, who was on suspension. The 
professor sued the college, the president and various offi-
cials. The district court ruled that the professor should 
100 Ibid., p. 2047. 
101431 F. Supp. 1379 (1977). 
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be reinstated to the suspended status he held prior to the 
termination. The federal court of appeals determined that 
the doctrine of de facto tenure had not been clearly estab-
lished as a constitutional right at the time of the termina-
tion. Consequently, the college president was acting in good 
faith and immune from personal liability. The appeals court 
attempted to formulate criteria for determining the reason-
ableness of school officials' lack of knowledge of due pro-
cess requirements and suggested weighing such issues as the 
status and responsibility of each individual defendant, and 
the relative certainty of the constitutional issue. The 
appellate court awarded nominal damages of one dollar and re-
fused to remand the case for a hearing since a hearing would 
not affect the decision to discharge the plaintiff. Back pay 
was refused in view of the teacher's two-year delay in bring-
ing his suit. 
The case is currently awaiting action by the Supreme 
Court. At issue also is the Eleventh Amendment question. In 
damage suits against state bodies under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983, should federal courts decide independently whether such 
bodies are "persons" able to be sued or should they accept 
holdings of state courts that such bodies are agencies of the 
state and are entitled to claims of sovereign immunity? 
Obviously the effect of holding in Monell that govern-
ment bodies are not absolutely immune from liability must 
await further litigation. In Skehan the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity issue must be addressed. Lower courts may choose to 
apply the standard of immunity to governmental bodies found 
in Wood v. Strickland102 or may develop another standard. 
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The ruling in Carey v. Piphus 103 also has a tremen-
dously important effect. Even though a court is permitted to 
award monetary damages for emotional and mental distress 
caused by constitutional deprivation, the plaintiff must 
prove that he has actually suffered some harm. In absence of 
this proof the plaintiff would receive only nominal damages 
that the United States Supreme Court has determined to be one 
dollar. Carey could nullify the financial risk caused by 
removal of municipal immunity under Section 1983. Time will 
tell. Presently it is impossible to predict how frequently 
and under what circumstances school boards will be liable for 
denying constitutional rights. 
102wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
1°3 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978). 
CHAPTER IV 
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 
AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
In 1966 Section 1983 was used for the first time in 
the education arena. The case1 involved the manner used by 
75 
the Hendersonville Board of Education in desegregating its 
teaching staff. The board failed to reemploy sixteen out of 
twenty-four black teachers. At the same time the board re-
employed all white teachers and added fourteen new, inexperi-
enced white teachers to the teaching staff. In this case the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first stated the principle 
that would guide future desegregation of teaching staffs. 
The principle was that school boards were required to set up 
objective standards for the employment and retention of 
teachers and to apply the standards without racial considera-
tion. Failure to comply with this principle would result in 
individual liability for damages. 
The liability was evident in the 1967 Wall v. Stanley 
County Board of Education decision. 2 In this ruling a black 
teacher, who was dismissed without due process, was awarded 
monetary damages and was ordered to be objectively considered 
for reemployment, with the burden of justifying a failure to 
1chambers v. Hendersonville Board of Education, 364 
F. Zd 189 (1966). 
2259 F. Supp. 238 (1966). 
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rehire placed on the board. The equal treatment principle of 
Chambers was reiterated when back pay and reinstatement were 
awarded a black teacher in a case involving nonrenewal due to 
a reduction of black enrollment in the teacher's schoo1.
3 
These holdings became the guidelines for other circuits to 
follow in desegregating teaching staffs where de jure segrega-
tion had existed. Boards of education were forced to justify 
their conduct by clear and convincing evidence if a plaintiff 
alleged that his constitutional rights had been violated. 
Lack of justification could result in the teacher's receiving 
damages and having the opportunity to be considered for re-
employment. These principles became firmly established and 
served as bases for other federal courts seeking precedent. 
The judicial foresight of the Fourth Circuit federal 
courts was evidencedin the 1971 Virginia district court 
decision4 that a mandatory maternity leave policy violated 
individual constitutional rights. Subsequently, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a mandatory maternity leave 
policy created an irrebuttable presumption in violation of 
the due process clause. 5 
Another precedent-setting decision of the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals was the 1973 student rights case, 
Board 
Supp. 
3North Carolina Teachers Association v. Asheboro City 
of Education, 393 F. Zd 736 (1968). 
4
cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. 
1159 (1971) Rev'd. 474 F. Zd 395 (1973). 
5cleveland v. Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632 (1974). 
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Herman v. South Carolina. 6 The court refused to order the 
University of South Carolina to compensate a student expel-
led for demonstrating against the Vietnam War, but the court 
did urge the University to reinstate the student in order to 
avoid equal protection problems (the school had previously 
reinstated other demonstrators) and thus make any further 
judicial action necessary. The court was instructing the 
University to take voluntary actions redressing student 
grievances or be held liable for damages. 
An example of this liability for violating the cons-
7 
titutional rights of students was found in Thonen. This 
case involved the disciplining of students for use of vul-
garity in the campus newspaper. The disciplining allegedly 
violated the students' First Amendment Rights. 
The case was filed against the chancellor of East 
Carolina University and the chairman of the university's 
board of trustees in both their official and individual capa-
cities. The case arose when a student wrote an open letter 
to the East Carolina University student newspaper objecting 
to rules prohibiting visitation of perso~s of the opposite 
sex in dormitory rooms. The letter used a vulgar expression 
in reference to the university's chancellor. When the 
letter was published, the author of the letter and the editor 
of the newspaper were expelled from the university. 
6457 F. 2d 902 (1973). 
7 Thonen v. Jenkins, 455 F. 2d 977 (1972). 
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Suit was filed in federal district court asking for 
reinstatement, that their records be expunged of disciplinary 
action, and that money damages and attorneys' fees be 
awarded. The district court ordered the students readmitted 
8 
and records expunged. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed that order. 9 The district court also awarded nomi-
nal damages ($100) against the defendants to both plaintiffs 
because the expulsion violated the students' First Amendment 
rights. The district court also awarded attorneys' fees and 
expenses of $3,429.60 plus costs against the defendants. The 
court stated: 
Since the complaint was filed three years ago the defen-
dants have blocked all avenues of compromise and fully 
litigated every detail much to the delay and detriment 
of the plaintiffs. By insisting upon litigation ... , 
by totally disregarding the constitutional rights of 
plaintiffs ... , and by interposing a variety of 
administrative obstacles to thwart plaintiffs ... , 
defe~dants 1fiave been stubborn to the point of obdurate obst1nacy. 
This award was upheld by Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals but the case was remanded to determine if the 
$3,429.60 should be assessed against the defendants officially 
or individually. 11 Also on remand the court was instructed to 
examine whether the defendants acted in good faith under the 
Wood decision standard. When the case was remanded, the dis-
trict court dismissed the damages against the defendants in 
8Ibid. 
9 Jenkins, 491 F. 2d 722 (1973). Thonen v. 
10 Jenkins, 374 Thonen v. F. Supp. 134, 139 (1974). 
11Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F. 2d 3, 6 (1975). 
their individual capacities and awarded attorneys' fees 
against them in their official capacities. 12 
The defendants certainly did not heed the judicial 
advice given in Herman to take the necessary judicial steps 
to avoid unnecessary litigation and liability. This case 
demonstrates the tenacity of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in protecting the constitutional rights of 
individuals. 
79 
A case outside of education illustrates the willing-
ness of the Fourth Circuit to establish precedents in insur-
ing constitutional protection. 13 In 1972, courts generally 
would not hold plaintiffs liable for negligence under 1983. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, asserted that 
a state court clerk whose negligence impeded the filing of a 
postconviction petition was not immune from suit under Sec-
tion 1983. The court said that "the act of filing papers 
with the court is ministerial and inflexibly mandatory as any 
f h 1 k ' 'b'l' . "14 o t e c er s respons1 1 1t1es. The court ruled that 
ordinarily negligence does not create cause of action under 
civil rights law, but negligence that results in depriving 
someone of constitutional rights does create a federal cause 
of action. 
In another Fourth Circuit ruling, 15 the court decided 
that North Carolina common law made a sheriff liable for the 
12 Ibid. 
l3McCray v. Maryland, 456 F. 2d 1 (1972). 
14 Ibid. 
15scott v. Vandiver, 476 F. Zd 238, 242 (1973). 
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misconduct of temporary law enforcement officers. This de-
cision constituted a liberal interpretation of vicarious 
liability, or the legal responsibilities of board members for 
the actions of a subordinate or agent of the board. Vicarious 
liability was addressed in the recent Monell case. Section 
1983 imposes liability on a local government only when an 
official policy or custom "causes" an employee to violate 
another's constitutional right. 16 
The precedent-setting role of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in providing constitutional protection was 
evidenced in a 1975 desegregation case. 17 The plaintiff, a 
black teacher, alleged that her dismissal was racially 
motivated and that she was entitled to reinstatement plus 
back pay. The court held that the school district was not a 
"person," and hence not subject to suit under Section 1983, 
but that board members sued in their official capacities were 
"persons" and liable for the equitable relief sought. At the 
time of this ruling, the Supreme Court had not yet established 
whether school boards could be sued in their official capacity 
as "persons." Again this demonstrates the more liberal Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals interpretation of the Civil Rights 
Law of 1871. 
The court also determined that the school district was 
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because while the 
16 
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Ser-
98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). vices, 
17 
Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School 
District, 521 F. 2d 1201 (1975). 
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school board actions may have constituted "state action," the 
school district was not a defendant. 
A district court in Virginia again held that school 
board members are 11persons" under Section 1983 when they are 
sued in their official capacities. The court stated that a 
contrary ruling would "emasculate" the Civil Rights Act of 
1871.
18 
This ruling followed the landmark Wood decision19 
that established the guidelines concerning immunity from lia-
bility. Most cases following Wood have found officials to be 
immune from liability in an action for damages. The court 
acknowledged that the good faith immunity was incorporated in 
Section 1983 but good faith was not a defense in a suit for 
back pay, which was an integral part of the equitable remedy 
20 
for reinstatement and not merely a suit for damages. 
Another post-Wood case involved the dismissal of a 
nontenured community college teacher at Guilford Technical 
Institute (GTI) in North Carolina.
21 
Litigation arose when 
the teacher was required to teach a remedial mathematics 
course that the teacher contended was contrary to his con-
tract. When the teacher protested, he was discharged without 
compliance with the GTI discharge procedure. The teacher 
brought suit in federal district court for breach of his 
18 Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (1975). 
19wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
20 Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (1975). 
21Jeffus v. Burman, C-37-6-73 (1975). 
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employment contract and violations of his constitutional 
right to free speech and due process. 
A five-person jury returned a verdict of $86,655 for 
the teacher. The award was as follows: $15,000 personally 
against four GTI administrators; $60,000 against GTI as puni-
tive or exemplary damages for violation of the teacher's 
constitutional rights to free speech and due process and 
$11,655 against GTI for breach of the teacher's employment 
contract. After the trial judge indicated that he intended 
to set aside the verdict as excessive, the parties reached a 
settlement of $18,000 - the teacher's annual salary of 
$15,540 and attorneys' fees of $2,460. 
A very different judgment was rendered in another 
1975 North Carolina case. 22 A nontenured professor at Wes-
tern Carolina University brought suit when tenure was denied. 
He alleged that the denial was based on his involvement in 
union organizing activities and therefore violated his First 
Amendment Rights. When the case was tried in district court, 
the members of the board of trustees were not held liable for 
damages. 
A 1976 North Carolina district court decision 23 pro-
vided a formula for determining damages to be awarded a 
teacher for unlawful nonrenewal. Two teacherssued the school 
board alleging that the board's decision not to renew their 
22 Grant v. Abbott, BA 74-120, -121, and -125 (1975). 
23Head v. Haywood County Board of Education, Civil 
No. A-C-75-69 (1976). 
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contracts was unconstitutional, arbitrary, capricious, or 
based upon personal or political reasons. The jury awarded 
the teachers $2,500 in damages. The school board then called 
for the verdict to be set aside or a new trial held on the 
basis that the evidence did not support the findings. 
The federal district court affirmed the verdict of 
the jury but denied the teachers' request for reinstatement 
and back wages. The court determined that $2,500 in damages 
the jury had awarded had been computed properly. The form-
ula for determining damages for wrongful termination was the 
difference between the amount that the plaintiff would have 
earned under the contract less whatever the plaintiff earned 
under other employment. The damages should also include the 
present cash value of losses that may arise from the damaging 
effect of the nonrenewal on future employment. 
In this case the court decided that little, if any, 
back wages should be awarded because the plaintiffs had not 
fulfilled their duty to seek other employment. Also very 
little was awarded for injury to future employment because 
the "taint" of the nonrenewal was found not to be as perva-
sive as the teachers had contended. The district court 
stated that the damages requested by the teachers in addition 
to what was already awarded (back wages and reinstatement) 
would constitute "double recovery" and thereby unjustly en-
rich the teachers. 24 
24
Ibid. 
A nine-year case 25 involving the dismissal of a 
teacher for having someone take the National Teacher Exami-
nation for her demonstrates the Fourth Circuit Court of 
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Appeals' strict adherence to constitutional safeguards. The 
teacher first sued in district court alleging that her due 
process rights had been violated when (1) the notice to her 
that she could appear before the State Board of Education to 
show cause why the board should reinstate the certificate was 
defective because the decision to revoke was made in private 
session by the state superintendent; and (2) the hearing 
wrongly placed the burden on the teacher to prove that the 
invalidation was unwarranted. The district court denied but 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because proced-
ural due process had been violated as Huntley alleged. The 
court ordered a full de novo hearing to be held. The State 
Board held the hearing as instructed and found the teacher 
guilty of fraud and revoked her teacher's certificate. Hunt-
ley filed suit again alleging that the new hearing violated 
her due process rights. Both the district and appellate 
court rejected. Finally, Huntley filed suit again asking for 
back pay from the period beginning with the original certifi-
cate revocation (Dec. 1967), which did not satisfy due pro-
cess standards, and ending with the date of the later 
revocation (October, 1974), which did not satisfy due process. 
25 
Huntley v. North Carolina State Board of Education, 
No. 75-2096 (1976). 
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The court denied, citing two of its earlier opinions 
that had granted back pay until the procedural requirements 
of a proper hearing had been given. 26 The court said that 
the two teachers, Horton and Burt, had been employed under 
valid contracts while Huntley had procured her contract by 
fraud. Consequently, she had never had a valid, pre-existing 
contractual relationship that must be honored until the date 
due process requirements were met. The court determined that 
Huntley had no property right and, therefore, no claim to 
back pay. 
The strict adherence to procedural due process had 
also been evidence earlier in the 1974 nonrenewal of a non-
tenured teacher in Charlotte, North Carolina. 27 Once the 
court determined that procedural due process had been vio-
lated, the school system was ordered to reinstate the plain-
tiff immediately, with full salary and other compensation as 
if her contract had been renewed. Also, the defendants were 
enjoined from dismissing the plaintiff unless a full hearing 
was conducted to determine whether the board's decision not 
to renew the contract was "arbitrary and capricious." Full 
procedural due process had to be given the plaintiff at this 
hearing. 
The rediscovery of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Law of 1871 has provided a much easier path to follow in 
26Horton v. Board of Education, 464 F. Zd 536 (1972); 
Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School District, 
521 F. Zd 1201 (1975). 
27 sigmon v. Poe, 381 F. Supp. 387 (1974). 
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actions seeking damages from school boards. Traditionally, 
board members have enjoyed a far greater degree of immunity 
than allowed in actions brought under Section 1983. Profes-
sor W. Prosser, a leading academic authority on tort law, 
expresses: "A public officer ... cannot be held liable for 
doing in a proper manner an act which is commanded or autho-
28 
rized by a valid law." 
North Carolina, as other states, has consented to suit 
29 
by adopting tort claims act. Under state law of torts, to 
maintain a suit against a board member or officer, a plain-
tiff must show malice, ill will, or corruption. Board mem-
bers are liable under traditional tort law for acts done in 
bad faith (misfeasance). However, they are not liable under 
traditional tort law for negligence (malfeasance) or inaction 
misfeasance. This burden of proof imposed on plaintiffs has 
been so difficult that no reported North Carolina case of 
recovery against a board member can be found. 
When a board member is sued under state tort law, he 
can reply that his acts are those of a government officer, 
and the plaintiff's action will be defeated unless the plain-
tiff can prove malice or absence of good faith on the board 
member's part. Under Section 1983 the board member enjoys 
only qualified immunity.
30 
Under the subjective aspect of 
the defense, the defendant must show that he acted sincerely 
28 
W. Prosser, Law of Torts, 127 (4th ed. 1971). 
29 
N. C. General Statute Section 143-291 et seq. 
30
wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
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and with the belief that he was doing right, and had no 
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional 
rights. Under the subjective test, the defendant must show 
that he neither knew, nor reasonalby should have known, that 
his act would violate the clearly established rights of the 
plaintiff, as such rights existed at the incident. Once the 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the defendant 
must factually prove that he is entitled to the qualified 
immunity defense just described. Also, federal law dictates 
that a Section 1983 lawsuit may be instituted in either 
federal district or state court because both courts share 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
Section 1983 has proven to be an excellent tool for 
teachers to use to protect their constitutional rights from 
being violated under the color of state or local laws, includ-
ing public school board rules and regulations, and administra-
tive and teacher directives. Whenever "settled, undisputed" 
federal rights are violated in the dismissal process, teachers 
have Section 1983 as a vehicle to insure their constitutional 
protection. This consitutional protection has been especi-
ally guarded by federal courts in the Fourth Circuit. 
An example of the closely guarded consitutional pro-
tection is evident in the language of a 1974 teacher dismis-
sal case, Janetta v. Cole.31 
No preview of an uncertain future was needed to determine 
that firing one for his participating 'in circulating a 
31493 F. Zd 1334, 1338 (1974). 
letter ~f complaint' was constitutionally impermis-
sible.3 
Janetta illustrates the tenacious protection afforded First 
Amendment rights by the Fourth Circuit. 
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y· 
The previously described civil rights cases ~ demon-
strate the leadership role of the Fourth Circuit federal 
courts in setting fair, objective standards for the employ-
ment and retention of all teachers, regardless of race. The 
liability of school boards and school administration for un-
constitutional teacher dismissals was clearly established. 
Scott, 34 McCray35 and Cohen36 demonstrate the willingiless of 
the courts to go beyond the current legal interpretations to 
insure constitutional protection. In Burt 37 and Paxman, 38 
the courts' determination that school boards were "persons" 
in their official capacities and subject to suit illustrates 
the courts' liberal interpretation of Section 1983 of the 
Civil Rights Law of 1871. This progressive nature was also 
evidenced when the Fourth Circuit Coart of Appeals 
32 Ibid. 
33chambers v. Hendersonville Board of Education, 364 
F. Zd 1&9 (1966); Wall v. Stanley County Board of Education, 
North Carolina Teachers Association v. Asheboro City Board of 
Education, 393 F. 2d 736 (1968). 
34scott v. Vandiver, 476 F. 2d 238, 242 (1973). 
35McCray v. Maryland, 345 F. Zd 1 (1972). 
36cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. 
Supp. 1159 (1971) Rev'd 474 F. Zd 395 (1973). 
37Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School 
District, 521 F. 2d 1201 (1975). 
38
P w· 4 k 390 F ( axman v. 1~ erson, . Supp. 442 1975). 
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acknowledged that a suit based on the Constitution was appro-
priate against a North Carolina county. 39 All of these 
decisions occurred prior to the Supreme Court's Monell ruling 
which spoke to the immunity of municipal agenci£s. 
In conclusion, it may be said that if the constitu-
tional rights of teachers are violated in the Fourth Circuit, 
the teachers have a judiciary watchdog to protect their rights 
even if the constitution violation lacks precedent. 
39 cox v. Stanton, 529 F. 2d 47 (1975). 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
On March 23, 1871, President Ulysees S. Grant ad-
dressed the Forty-second Congress concerning the failure of 
certain states to enforce the constitutional guarantees of 
the newly enfranchised black citizenry. Grant called on Con-
gress for legislation that would effectually secure life, 
liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all 
parts of the United States. Also presented to Congress was 
a 600-page report which described the activities of the Ku 
Klux Klan and the inability of state governments to cope with 
the Klan's illegal activities. 
The Forty-second Congress responded with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871. The purpose of the legislation was, and 
continues to be, to serve as an antidote to discriminatory 
state laws, to protect federal rights that are available but 
are not being enforced. Relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
may take the form of equity or damages. 
Following the fervor surrounding the passage, the 
Civil Rights Law of 1871 became a neglected piece of legisla-
tion used only slightly. Judicial decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in the 1870's and 1880's seriously weak-
ened the impact of the civil rights legislation that the Re-
construction Congresses had enacted between 1866 and 1875. 
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Equality and freedom did not begin to become realities for 
the nation's blacks until nearly a century later. The Civil 
Rights Law of 1871 was rediscovered with the 1961 Monroe 
case. This decision, holding that municipalities were not 
"persons" under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and, therefore, immune 
from suit, left many unanswered questions. At the same time 
it opened the federal judiciary to suits against public offi-
cials, based on Section 1983. Monroe was interpreting the 
Forty-second Congress as not intending the word "person" to 
include municipalities or municipal agencies. Because of 
Monroe, suits alleging wrongdoings by a school district were 
generally filed directly against school officials and not 
against the district itself. 
The late sixties witnessed the first use of 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 in the educational arena. Cases involving 
teachers whose contracts were not renewed (usually as the 
result of school integration) were brought on the basis of a 
violation of Section 1983. The courts established a standard 
that placed the burden on the school board to justify its 
conduct by clear and convincing evidence when the plaintiffs 
made out an initial case of constitutional deprivation. 
Failure to comply with this standard could result in individ-
ual liability for damages. Before 1969, in cases affecting 
school board members, courts had awarded only equitable re-
lief (forcing the defendant to take or refrain from taking 
action) as opposed to money damages. Since 1969, courts 
have awarded money damages against school board members for 
violations of teachers' constitutional rights in dismissal 
and nonrenewal cases. 
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Liability under Section 1983 has often been referred 
to as sporadic and inconsistent. Generally, until 1975, if 
the administrator or board member could show that he acted in 
"good faith," he had a good chance of avoiding liability. 
For example, if an administrator could show that he acted 
under the apparently valid orders of his superior or if the 
school board member could show his action was sanctioned or 
required by State Board of Education regulation or state 
statute, then each would probably be held immune from lia-
bility. Proven "good faith" was not always a sure win, 
however. 
Other decisions recognized good faith as a defense 
only when school board members or school officials at the 
time of their acts (1) could reasonably believe they were 
acting legally, and (2) in fact acted in reliance on this 
belief. Monroe v. Pape failed to define the circumstances 
under which officials could be held liable. Unanswered was 
the question of whether officials would be held responsible 
for any act that deprived someone of "rights and privileges 
or immunities" regardless of whether it were done maliciously 
and deliberately or inadvertently. The Wood v. Strickland 
case answered this question and formulated a national rule 
concerning good faith immunity in Section 1983. Wood estab-
lished that board members could be sued personally for 
damages for the violation of constitutional rights. A good 
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faith defense was defined as a combination of both subjec-
tive and objective elements: A board member must "be acting 
sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right" (without 
malice or ill will) and he must act in accordance with 
"settled, indisputable law." Lower federal district courts 
further identified four objective measures of good faith: 
(1) Knowledge of prior law but without the responsibility to 
predict future constitutional law; (2) a reasonable factual 
basis for board action as judged from the perspective of the 
board member making a decision; (3) prior approval by a 
superior government agency of a given course of action; and 
(4) adherence to prior, established practices. 
Most cases decided after Wood have found officials to 
be immune from liability in an action for damages. These 
suits have been most often directed against board members and 
school officials in their individual capacities. This has 
occurred because of general unavailability of Section 1983 
action against the school board as an entity (due to the 
Monroe ruling that municipalities are not "persons"). 
Not every lower federal court ruling held that school 
board members, when sued in their official capacities, were 
not "persons" under Section 1983. For example, a 1975 dis-
trict court in Virginia found that school board members were 
"persons" when sued in their official capacities and that a 
contrary ruling would "emasculate" the Civil Rights Law of 
1971. 
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This issue was finally addressed in the 1978 case, 
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. The 
ruling established that municipal agencies could be sued 
directly under Section 1983 and that this was the original 
intention of the Forty-second Congress. ~he Monroe Court had 
misunderstood the meaning of the act.) From this premise, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs could gain finan-
cial, declaratory, or injunctive relief from local govern-
ments when the plaintiffs' constitutional rights have been 
violated by persons who are carrying out an official policy 
or custom of the governmental body. The Court noted, however, 
that it did not have the occasion to address and did not in-
tend to address at that time what the full contours of munic-
ipal liability under Section 1983 might be. The Court 
emphasized that in order for Section 1983 to keep its origi-
nal meaning, municipal bodies sued under Section 1983 could 
not be entitled to an absolute immunity. 
Another important decision, Carey v. Piphus, rendered 
just prior to Monell, determined that monetary damages for 
emotional and mental distress caused by constitutional depri-
vation was permissible but that the individuals seeking to 
collect such damages would have the burden of proving that 
they actually suffered some harm. In absence of such proof 
the individual would be entitled to collect nominal damages 
that the Supreme Court set at one dollar. 
An examination of the Section 1983 federal decisions 
in the Fourth Circuit indicates that courts have closely 
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protected the constitutional rights of its constituents. The 
early civil rights cases provided guidelines that school 
boards throughout the nation have been forced to follow in 
teacher dismissals and nonrenewal of contracts. Many Fourth 
Circuit decisions have demonstrated a willingness to set pre-
cedents if it is believed a new interpretation is necessary 
to protect individual constitutional rights. The constitu-
tional guarantees of due process for dismissed teachers in 
the Fourth Circuit have been tenaciously protected by the 
federal judiciary. 
Conclusions 
The stated purpose of this legal historical study 
was to clarify the status of 42 U.S.C. 1983 in the dismissal 
and nonrenewal process for teachers, school board members, 
and school administrators. The conclusions listed below are 
drawn from the literature and legal pYoceedings reviewed in 
this study. 
1. The courts' interpretation and application of quali-
fied immunity defense against damages provide a 
degree of protection for school officials. To have 
this protection, school officials must act without 
malice and show that they neither knew nor should 
have known that their acts would violate the settled 
constitutional rights of teachers. 
2. Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, 
the defendant must factually prove that he is en-
titled to the qualified immunity defense. 
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3. The impact of the ruling that school districts are 
"persons" subject to suit under Section 1983 remains 
unclear. Access to the financial resources of a 
school district rather than the more meager resources 
of individuals may spur more suits. Also, judges and 
juries may be more willing to tap the more impersonal 
public financial resources than private in~ividual 
financial resources. 
4. Due to the recent determination that municipal 
agencies are "persons" and are without total immun-
ity, lower courts may apply the standard of immunity 
to governmental bodies found in Wood or may develop 
a different standard. 
5. First Amendment rights are closely guarded by courts 
and deserve special cautions from school officials. 
6. Procedural deficiencies that do not produce provable 
injury cannot result in back pay or other damages re-
sulting from termination if just cause exists for 
dismissal. The United States Supreme Court has set 
one dollar as a nominal award in such instances. 
7. The "absence of protected conduct" standard estab-
lished in Mt. Healthy means that teachers cannot use 
deprivation of constitutional rights to tie the hands 
of school officials when legitimate reasons exist for 
dismissal. 
8. Initially, a lawsuit does not have to mention Section 
1983 specifically, but must include the general 
allegation that the defendant violated a federally 
protected right under the color of state or local 
law. 
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9. Section 1983 lawsuit may be instituted in either the 
local federal or state court. If the action is filed 
in state court, any procedures set forth in state law 
dealing with claims and time deadlines that constrict 
the right of a plaintiff to assert his claim under 
Section 1983 are void under the United States 
Supremacy Clause. 
10. Generally, plaintiffs are not required to exhaust 
state judicial or administrative remedies before 
bringing suit for damages under the Civil Rights Law 
of 1871. 
11. Any constitutional violation will normally entitle a 
plaintiff to attorneys' fees. This factor may make 
school boards and officials hesitant to litigate 
disputes despite their individual qualified immunity. 
12. The courts' recognition of customs in the absence of 
written policies and procedures and the courts' re-
jection of respondeat superior should stimulate 
school boards to enact legally acceptable policies 
which set standards for its employees. 
13. The statute of limitations for civil rights actions 
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 is borrowed from state 
law. In North Carolina and most states it is three 
years. 
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14. The school board as an entity is most vulnerable when 
a claim is based on the Constitution, since a school 
board cannot defend itsel£ on basis of its good 
faith. 
15. Federal law does not prohibit a defendant from being 
insured by the state or obtaining liability insurance 
to protect his personal finances from depletion due 
to a compensatory award o£ damages against him under 
Section 1983. State insurance law may prevent pro-
tection for an award of punitive damages. 
16. School boards have not been granted the luxury of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits in federal 
court. School boards are to be treated as a munici-
pal corporation or as any other political subdivision 
which does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Recommendations for Educational Officials 
The legal developments with regard to the liability 
of school board members and school administrators under the 
Civil Rights Law of 1871 (42 U.S.C. Section 1983) have been 
rapid and dramatic. These legal developments, however, have 
not constrained boards of education to the point that they 
cannot dismiss incompetent teachers. Section 1983 litigation 
has defined what the constitutional rights of teachers are 
regarding dismissal and to a large degree Section 1983 liti-
gation has defined what immunity a school official can expect. 
1. School officials must be aware that they are respon-
sible £or board policies, rules, and customs being 
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constitutionally valid. With the help of legal coun-
sel, board members should periodically review current 
legal requirements, changes in the law, and activities 
of their board that might affect the constitutional 
rights of others. Whenever board members are in 
doubt about possible legal requirements in a particu-
lar situation, they should consult legal counsel. 
Due to the courts' tendency to find school boards 
liable for customs, it should be a high priority of 
school boards to transform customs into legally ac-
ceptable policies which will set standards for its 
employees and its agents. 
2. School boards should seek the counsel and approval, 
if appropriate, of state and federal agencies if it 
is believed that a particular action might result in 
litigation. Federal and state officials can aid 
school officials in defining limits of authority and 
providing information. 
3. School officials must always maintain a good faith in 
regard to teacher dismissals. Statements that could 
be construed as showing prejudice, malice, or ani-
mosity should be avoided. If board members act with-
out malice and avoid violating settled constitutional 
rights, they can feel comfortable in possessing quali-
fied immunity in their individual capacities. 
4. School board members should be aware that Section 1983 
has not tied their hands in dismissing teachers if 
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legitimate reasons exist. If dismissal would have 
incurred "absence of protected conduct" guaranteed by 
the Constitution, then courts would uphold the dis-
missal. 
5. School boards should be aware that if a constitutional 
violation does exist, the board will be liable for 
attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees have to be a con-
sideration of school boards in deciding whether to 
settle or pursue litigation. Boards need to be cog-
nizant that attorneys' fees can result in a consid-
erable sum to a school system if it is proven that an 
individual's constitutional rights have been violated 
under Section 1983. 
6. Recent interpretation that school boards are "persons" 
subject to Section 1983 may cause teachers to contest 
their dismissals more readily. Plaintiffs will have 
access to the greater financial resources of school 
boards; moreover a lesser degree of wrongful action 
will be necessary to gain damages from a governmental 
body than from an individual who possesses a qualified 
immunity granted under Wood. 
7. School boards then must protect themselves by insur-
ance policies that will protect their personal lia-
bility and also protect the liability of the school 
board as an entity. These liability insurance poli-
cies should be reviewed annually to make sure coverage 
remains adequate to protect the interest of the dis-
trict, board members, administrators, and other staff 
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members. Members from every level of the hierarchy 
should be aware of the type and amount of liability 
insurance coverage that they possess. Board lia-
bility insurance coverage should include coverage for 
the possible costs of defense suits against the board 
and also pay for possible judgments and settlements. 
8. Although procedural deficiencies usually cannot re-
sult in sizable damage awards unless provable injury 
is shown, school boards should adopt written due pro-
cess procedures for teacher dismissal. Legal counsel 
should review these procedures to make sure they 
accord with current statutes and case law. 
9. Care should be taken with board minutes in teacher 
dismissal proceedings. The minutes should reflect 
that a reasonable basis is present if a dismissal 
does occur. The records and minutes of the dismissal 
process must be retained to demonstrate the proper 
conduct of the board. The board needs to be very 
careful in following its own established practices 
and standard procedures. Officials who have followed 
established or traditional ways have not been held 
liable when those practices were later ruled invalid. 
10. Informed board members and administrators acting in 
good faith should have little difficulty defending 
their official acts if challenged under Section 1983. 
Board members and administrators can demonstrate this 
good faith by: following carefully any legal 
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requirements; basing action on a reasonable view of 
facts; if possible, relying on prior government ap-
proval; following established practices; and avoiding 
any action that can be interpreted as malicious. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The writer believes that a continuing study of the 
Civil Rights Law of 1871 is needed because of the evolving 
status of the law. Several key areas concerning the use of 
Section 1983 await further litigation. For example, the 
Monell case did not settle the issue of whether governments 
still retain some degree of immunity even though they are now 
considered to be "persons" subject to suit. Further li tiga-
tion could result in either the Wood v. Strickland standard 
of immunity being applied to governmental bodies or a diffe-
rent standard being developed. 
In Skehan, a case presently awaiting a Supreme Court 
decision, another key issue must be decided. In damage suits 
against state bodies under Section 1983, should federal 
courts decide independently whether such bodies are "persons" 
able to be sued or should they accept holdings of state 
courts that such bodies are agencies of the state for which 
it claims sovereign immunity. 
Future study is also needed to study the judicial un-
folding of Section 1983 with special attention being paid to 
the philosophies of newly-appointed members of the Supreme 
Court. 
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Since the late sixties, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(42 U.S.C. Section 1983) has become the most frequently used 
basis for challenging alleged unconstitutional acts of school 
board members and administrators. Section 1983 has proven to 
be a convenient vehicle for teachers to use in protecting 
their constitutional rights in the dismissal process. Liti-
gation of Section 1983 has proven to do just that--protect 
constitutional rights. Section 1983 liability has not made 
it impossible for school boards and school administrators to 
dismiss teachers if just cause exists. Section 1983 has 
forced school board members and administrators to continually 
review board policies, rules, and customs to make sure that 
they are and remain constitutionally valid. Section 1983 
litigation has struck a reasonable balance between the need 
to dismiss teachers for just cause and the need to protect 
individual rights. 
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